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A Read-the-Bill Rule for Congress
Hanah Metchis Volokh*
ABSTRACT
In response to recent high-profile instances of rushed legislation, a po-
litical movement has formed to urge legislators to read bills before voting on
them. In this Article, I argue that legislators have a duty to read the text of
proposed legislation before voting to enact it. Putting aside partisan con-
cerns, a rushed legislative process creates real problems because it forces
legislators to vote on bills without having time to properly evaluate the new
legal rules that are being imposed on citizens. If a rule or norm of reading
the bill can slow the legislative process enough to provide for thorough con-
sideration of proposed legislation, it will bring a substantial benefit in the
form of better laws. The rule will also draw the attention of legislators to
their primary, fundamental role ofmaking good law.
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 26, 2009, the House of Representatives passed the American
Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009,1 better known as the Waxman-
Markey cap-and-trade bill, by a vote of 219 to 212.2 As the closeness of the
vote shows, the bill was highly controversial. Nearly as controversial as the
substance was the form in which the bill was brought to a vote. On the even-
ing of Monday, June 22, 2009, Democratic leaders replaced the 1,000-page
text of the bill that had emerged from the House Energy and Commerce
Committee with a different 1,200-page text that included new measures de-
signed to help the bill pass.3 Still worried about whether the bill had enough
votes, the Democratic leaders added another 300 pages of amendments at 3
a.m. on Friday, just before the debate and vote.4 Last-minute amendments,
* Visiting Assistant Professor, Emory University School of Law. As with
much of my work, this Article would not have been possible without my nearly conti-
nuous conversations with Sasha Volokh and William Baude. Many thanks to them,
and also to Bill Buzbee, Cliff Carrubba, Jamie Crighton, Chad Flanders, Roger Ford,
Michael Gerhardt, Dan Greenberg, Victoria Nourse, Michael Perry, Robert Schapiro,
Scott Scheule, Julie Seaman, Lawrence Solum, Jay Tamboli, Seth Barrett Tillman,
Eugene Volokh, and Vladimir Volokh for their helpful comments.
1. H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009).
2. 155 CONG. REc. H7686 (daily ed. June 26, 2009). The bill was never
brought to a floor vote in the Senate, and thus did not become law.
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even long ones, are not uncommon in Congress. But shockingly, even by the
time the vote occurred, there was no complete copy of the Waxman-Markey
bill in existence anywhere. One commentator explained the situation:
When Waxman-Markey finally hit the floor, there was no actual
bill. Not one single copy of the full legislation that would, hours
later, be subject to a final vote was available to members of the
House. The text made available to some members of Congress still
had "placeholders" - blank provisions to be filled in by subsequent
language - including one for the regulation of climate derivatives.
The last-minute amendments, too, had yet to be incorporated.
Even the House Clerk's office lacked a complete copy of the legis-
lation, and was forced to place a copy of the 1,200-page draft side
by side with the 300-page amendments.5
Without a copy of the bill to examine, how could the Representatives
understand what they were voting on? All they had to go on were assurances
- from party leaders, from lobbyists for interest groups who had negotiated
the bill and amendments, and from staffers who had been frantically reading
the parts of the legislation that were available. Even if a Representative had
managed to read through all 1,500 pages of text and amendments during the
single day before the vote, there would not have been time to even begin to
understand the implications of the proposed law and its interaction with sta-
tutes already on the books. In the words of Representative John Conyers -
who does not himself favor reading the text of bills but understands what
such an effort would entail - "What good is reading the bill if it's a thousand
pages and you don't have two days and two lawyers to find out what it means
after you read the bill?"6
In the wake of the Waxman-Markey vote and other recent instances of
rushed legislation, a grass-roots Read the Bill movement emerged.7 Critics of
proposed legislation, particularly of the health care reform bill passed in
20 10,8 have rallied around a call for Members of Congress to literally read
each entire bill before voting on it. At least three different online petitions
5. Id.
6. Nicholas Ballasy, Conyers Sees No Point in Members Reading 1,000-Page
Health Care Bill - Unless They Have 2 Lawyers to Interpret It for Them, CNS NEWS,
July 27, 2009, available at http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/51610.
7. Long and complex legislation being rushed through Congress with inade-
quate time for legislators to read it is not a new problem. See, e.g., Dan Greenberg,
Chaos Theory in Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1993, at A23 (complaining that the
text of a 3,000 page budget bill was not available until the morning of the vote). The
issue had not previously received much popular attention, however.
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urged legislators to do just that,9 and the idea repeatedly appears in blogs and
op-eds, as well as at Senators' and Representatives' town hall meetings with
constituents.10  The idea even made its way into the Republican Party's
"Pledge to America" in the 2010 midterm elections," and when Republicans
gained control of the House of Representatives after those elections, they
amended the House Rules to require that a bill be available to Members of
Congress and to the public for three days before the House can hold a vote on
it.12
Rushed legislation is not a partisan problem. Many of the examples
given by proponents of the Read the Bill movement portray Democrats en-
gaging in bad behavior while Republicans decry it,13 but this is simply a func-
9. Read To Vote urges members of Congress to "pledge to read every word of
every bill before casting [their] vote[s]." Read To Vote, http://readtovote.org/site/
(last visited Nov. 4, 2010). Read the Bill endorses a statute or internal rule in the
House and Senate "to require that non-emergency legislation and conference reports
be posted on the Internet for 72 hours before debate begins." Read the Bill,
http://readthebill.org/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2010). This would give Members of Con-
gress the opportunity to read the bill but would not require that they do so. The Re-
sponsible Health Care Reform Pledge asked Members of Congress to pledge not to
vote for health care reform without personally reading the entire bill and giving the
public access to the text of the bill for seventy-two hours. Let Freedom Ring: Pro-
moting Constitutional, Government, Economic Freedom & Traditional Values, The
Responsible Healthcare Reform Pledge, http://www.letfreedomringusa.com/pledge-
to-read (last visited Nov. 4. 2010). The Pledge collected over 120 signatures from
Senators, Representatives, and congressional candidates. Id.
10. See, e.g., Victoria McGrane, Read the Bill? It Might Not Help, POLITICO,
Sept. 8, 2009, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0909/26846.html ("Across the
country, 'Read the bill!' has become a rallying cry of the health care debate. People
are shouting it at town halls. Local newspapers teem with editorials and readers'
letters demanding that lawmakers do it. Bloggers and their commenters say the same.
Politicians of both parties are taunting their foes across the aisle with it."); Ian Urbina,
Beyond Beltway, Health Debate Turns Hostile, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2009, at Al
("Parts of [Rep. Castor's] remarks were drowned out by chants of 'read the bill, read
the bill' and 'tyranny' . . . .").
11. See REPUBLICANS IN CONGRESS, A PLEDGE TO AMERICA: A NEw GOVERNING
AGENDA BUILT ON THE PRIORITIES OF OUR NATION, THE PRINCIPLES WE STAND FOR &
AMERICA'S FOUNDING VALUES 33, http://pledge.gop.gov/resources/library/documents
/solutions/a-pledge-to-america.pdf.
12. See H.R. Res. 5, 112th Congress §2(b) (2011) (amending House Rule XXI to
read, "It shall not be in order to consider a bill or joint resolution which has not been
reported by committee until the third calendar day (excluding Saturdays, Sundays, or
legal holidays except when the House is in session on such a day) on which such
measure has been available to Members, Delegates, and the Resident Commission-
er.").
13. For example, Democratic Senator Chris Dodd was unaware that a bill he
authored and sponsored created an "interim appointment power." See Brian Beutler,
Dodd Unaware of Interim Appointment Power for Warren?, TALKING POINTS MEMO,
1372011]
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tion of the fact that the Democrats have recently controlled both houses of
Congress and as a result have set the agenda and moved bills forward. Re-
publicans have been equally guilty of using rush tactics when in power.14
The PATRIOT Act, for example, was passed by a Republican-controlled
Congress in an extremely rushed format, just six weeks after the September
11 attacks.' 5 The time frame probably did not allow a full reading by Mem-
bers of Congress,16 and public debate about the wisdom of the PATRIOT
Act's provisions continued long after the bill was enacted.17
Nor is providing enough time to read the bill a partisan idea. During
Barack Obama's campaiin for President, he made a pledge, which he called
Sunlight Before Signing: "Too often bills are rushed through Congress and
to the president before the public has the opportunity to review them. As
President, Obama will not sign any non-emergency bill without giving the
American public an opportunity to review and comment on the White House
website for five days." 19 The Read the Bill movement focuses on giving
Members of Congress time to read the bill before voting, whereas Sunlight
Before Signing imposes a waiting period between congressional passage and
the President signing the bill into law.20 The ideas are not identical, but are
related. Both would provide participants in the legislative process, along with
Sept. 14, 2010, available at http://tpmdc.talkingpointsmemo.com/2010/09/dodd-
unaware-of-interim-appointment-power-for-warren.php.
14. Left-wing activist Michael Moore, for instance, criticized Congress for pass-
ing bills without reading them in his documentary, Fahrenheit 9/11. See Byron York,
Profligate Congress Needs to Read Its Own Bills, WASH. EXAMINER, Oct. 10, 2010,
available at http://washingtonexaminer.com/politics/profligate-congress-needs-read-
its-own-bills.
15. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001)
(passed Oct. 26, 2001). -
16. See ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, EFF ANALYSIS OF THE PROVISIONS
OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT, available at http://w2.eff.org/Privacy/Surveillance/
Terrorism/20011031_eff usapatriot analysis.php ("[I]t seems clear that the vast
majority of the sections included were not carefully studied by Congress. . . .").
17. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Crisis Governance in the Ad-
ministrative State: 9/11 and the Financial Meltdown of 2008, 76 U. CHI. L. REV.
1613, 1660 (2009) (noting that the PATRIOT Act was still controversial when it was
extended in 2005).
18. Sadly, President Obama abandoned this pledge after taking office. See Ka-
tharine Q. Seelye, "White House Changes the Terms of a Campaign Pledge About
Posting Bills Online," N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2009, at Al l, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/22/us/politics/22pledge.html? r-l&pagewanted-pr
int.
19. Organizing for America, Ethics, http://www.barackobama.com/issues/ethics/
index campaign.php (last visited Nov. 4, 2010).
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ordinary Americans, an opportunity to examine the actual text of a bill before
it becomes law.
The issue of sufficient time to read a bill is a procedural one, based in
political theory and good governance concepts,21 not in party politics, though
legislators and others can seize on it to score political points. This Article
attempts to move beyond the partisan political aspects of the current debate
and discuss the deeper principles behind it. The fundamental concern is that
leaders in Congress sometimes rush big, important bills through the legisla-
tive process without providing an opportunity for all Members to properly
22
review the bill and consider its effects and implications.
In this Article, I argue that a Read the Bill norm, coupled with a norm of
writing bills in readable and understandable language, could improve the
legislative process. Lawmaking is the most primary, fundamental part of a
legislator's job. Congress is the governmental body that writes laws that eve-
ryone else in the nation must follow.23 Members of Congress need to take
that responsibility seriously if the United States is to be governed by reasona-
ble, effective laws.24
This Article's focus on advocating constitutional and prudential rules for
Congress to follow may seem unusual to some readers. Legal scholars have
historically neglected Congress as an institution.25 Despite hundreds of years
of developing theories about jurisprudence - the way judges should behave -
little attention has been given to theories of legisprudence - the way legisla-
21. See Jeremy Waldron, Principles of Legislation, in THE LEAST EXAMINED
BRANCH: THE ROLE OF LEGISLATURES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 15, 23 (Richard
W. Bauman & Tsvi Kahana eds., 2006) ("ln view of the inherent importance of law
and the interests and liberties that are at stake in their decision making, lawmakers
have a duty to take care when they are legislating.").
22. See Editorial, Read This!: Can Legislators Really Read Every Word ofEvery
Bill?, WASH. PosT, Sept. 23, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/09/22/AR2009092203473.html [hereinafter Read This!].
23. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § I ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested
in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Rep-
resentatives."); id. at art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 18 ("The Congress shall have Power ... [t]o
make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government
of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."); id. at art. VI, cl. 2
("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pur-
suance thereof ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land.").
24. See generally STEPHEN MICHAEL SHEPPARD, I Do SOLEMNLY SWEAR: THE
MORAL OBLIGATIONS OF LEGAL OFFICIALS (2009) (discussing morality as a basis for
official legislative conduct).
25. This is reflected in the title of a recent collection of essays, THE LEAST




Volokh: Volokh: Read-the-Bill Rule
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2011
MSSOURI LA WRE VIEW
tors should behave. 26 This Article fits within a nascent legisprudence litera-
ture that has begun to spring up among scholars such as Jeremy Waldron and
Adrian Vermeule.27 I do not attempt to provide a grand theory of legispru-
dence, but rather to explore the merits of legislators reading bills as a particu-
lar principle that could fit within a variety of legisprudential theories.
In Part II, I explain the importance of legislators thoroughly understand-
ing a bill from both a policy and a legal standpoint. I argue that reading the
bill is crucial to performing their duty as responsible lawmakers. Part III
turns to questions of how to put a Read the Bill rule into practice. My pro-
posal is to implement it as a norm, not a statutory requirement. This Part also
sketches the beginnings of a practical proposal for what a legislator should
read and understand at each stage of the legislative process, including com-
mittee votes, floor amendments, the floor vote, and the final vote after confe-
rence committee, and proposes some drafting reforms that could make it easi-
er for legislators to read and understand bills. In Part IV, I consider whether
the duty to read the text also applies to the President before he signs a bill into
law. I conclude that the constitutional evidence for a presidential duty to read
the bill is much weaker than for a congressional duty.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF READING THE BILL
A. Making Policy vs. Making Law
Requiring legislators to read the text of a bill before voting on it would
focus their attention on the lawmaking aspect of their jobs,28 which is now
26. My use of the term "legisprudence" is different from that of William Es-
kridge, who uses the word to refer to the subset of jurisprudence that deals with the
way judges should interpret statutes (i.e. statutory interpretation). See WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE
CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 587-88 (4th ed. 2007). I use the term to refer to theories
about how legislators should make law.
27. See, e.g., ADRIAN VERMEULE, MECHANISMS OF DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL
DESIGN WRIT SMALL (2007) (discussing the use of small-scale institutional devices to
promote democratic values); JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION
(1999) (exploring normative analysis of legislative processes and results); Adrian
Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Congressional Procedure, 71 U. CHI. L. REV.
361 (2004); Jeremy Waldron, Representative Lawmaking, 89 B.U. L. REV. 335 (2009)
[hereinafter Waldron, Representative Lawmaking]; Waldron, supra note 21. For a
sampling of other articles dealing with legisprudential issues, see Symposium, The
Most Disparaged Branch: The Role of Congress in the Twenty-First Century, 89 B.U.
L. REv. 331 (2009).
28. Cf SHEPPARD, supra note 24, at 168-69 ("At a minimum, moral obligations
within the legal system require a duty to carry out one's defined legal obligations in
the office one holds. . . . Within that obligation is an obligation to use one's best ef-
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almost ignored in favor of policymaking and other aspects.29 Reading a bill
may not be necessary to an understanding of the policy motivating a proposed
law, but it is necessary to understand what the proposed law is and what ef-
fects it will have in the real world. A responsible legislator must learn both.
Reading the bill, alone, usually will not provide legislators with a so-
phisticated understanding of the bill and the policy it implements. Anyone
who has read the text of a bill knows how mind-numbingly boring it is. A
bill lays out a list of rules, one after another, without context or explanation of
why they are important. It may include a findings section to provide some
background on the problems the bill attempts to solve. Usually this back-
ground material is very general, and it is placed in an introductory section
rather than intermingled with the rules. This format makes sense from the
perspective of what a statute is meant to do in the real world, once it is
enacted. A private individual or corporation wanting to take a particular ac-
tion needs to know whether that action is prohibited or regulated. A statute is
a set of rules to follow, and wordy explanations would only get in the way. A
long discussion of purposes and expected applications could be useful in later
interpretation, but it could just as easily lead to more confusion. This effect
can be seen when judges look for explanations in legislative history,3 o but the
confusion would be much the same if wordy explanations were enacted di-
rectly into law.
While these conventions of bill drafting are useful for later interpreters,
they do not make the law easy to analyze from the ex ante perspective of a
legislator. A judge is presented with a set of facts that have occurred and
turns to the statutory rules to determine whether any of them have been bro-
ken or to discern whether a party has the right or duty claimed. Conversely,
a legislator must perform the much more difficult task of looking at a set of
29. See Waldron, supra note 21, at 24 ("It is easy for [legislators] to regard law-
making as a distraction.... For [this] reason(], we need to place particular emphasis
on the duty of care that is associated with the lawmaking part of a legislator's busi-
ness."); see also Ann Seidman & Robert B. Seidman, ILTAM: Drafting Evidence-
Based Legislation for Democratic Social Change, 89 B.U. L. REV. 435, 437-38 (2009)
("[S]cholars tend to ignore the drafter's crucial role in the [lawmaking] process.").
30. See, e.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S.
687, 704-08 (1995) (using legislative history to show that habitat destruction is a form
of "tak[ing]" an animal); id. at 726-29 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (using legislative histo-
ry, including some of the same documents relied upon by the majority, to show the
opposite); see also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1235 (4th Cir. 1970)
(relying on a paragraph in the Clark-Case memo to interpret Title VII as allowing
general intelligence tests for employment), rev'd, 401 U.S. 424 (1971); id. at 1242,
1244 (Sobeloff, J., dissenting) (relying on the exact same paragraph of the memo to
interpret Title VII as allowing only strictly relevant tests of job qualifications for
employment).
31. See Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, The Next Word: Congressional
Response to Supreme Court Statutory Decisions, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 425, 436 (1992)
("[Courts] make decisions on existing and present fact situations . . . .").
2011] 141
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proposed rules and imagining the sorts of fact situations that will arise and be
judged under them. 32 He must also have an understanding of how existing
legal rules will interact with the proposed new rules. Additionally, he must
attempt to imagine how people will behave to avoid application of the rules -
for instance, if cigarettes are taxed more heavily, how many people will pay
the tax, how many will give up smoking, how many will switch to chewing
tobacco, and how many will buy cigarettes on the black market?33
These are extraordinarily difficult legal, policy, and economic problems,
which require considerable background information and expertise to analyze.
Very few legislators, if any, have the necessary skills and information to fully
analyze the merits of proposed legislation on their own, just by reading a bill.
Thus, some commentators argue that reading a bill is a waste of time. 34
Members of Congress are extraordinarily busy, with many competing de-
mands on their time, and they each must prioritize the time they spend on
various job-related tasks.35 They are faced with thousands of bills introduced
each year.36 Each Member is a part of several committees and subcommit-
tees, all of which hold meetings and hearings. 37 Members may be asked to
meet with the President and White House staff and with leaders in their own
party to discuss pending legislation and other matters. Members also perform
constituent services. They travel to and around their home districts, meeting
32. See id. at 435-36 ("[Legislatures] look ahead to the applications of the laws
that they make but are unable to anticipate each and every fact situation.").
33. Cf Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic
Case for Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163 (1998) (analyzing
the probable effects of different types of regulation on the cigarette industry).
34. See, e.g., Posting of Eric Posner to The Volokh Conspiracy, "Should legisla-
tors read bills?", http://volokh.com/2009/09/24/should-legislators-read-bills/ (Sept.
24, 2009, 11:14 CST) ("[P]olitical institutions are highly complex organizations that
have evolved in response to needs and pressures, and that simple-sounding rules rare-
ly do any good in complex settings. . . . [A]ll legislatures have found it necessary to
divide labor, form committees, hire staff, expect particular legislators to become ex-
perts and leaders in particular domains, and, indeed, delegate many functions to un-
elected expert regulators. This means that, for virtually any law, only a handful of
people can possibly have a sophisticated understanding of the bill in question.").
35. As Rep. Jeff Flake quipped when Congress took time out from health care
negotiations to pass a resolution honoring the 2,560th birthday of Confucius, "He who
spends time passing trivial legislation may find himself out of time to read healthcare
bill." See Lisa Mascaro & Richard Simon, House May Ban Honorific Resolutions,
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2010, available at http://articles.latimes.com/print/2010/nov/25/
nation/la-na-resolutions-20101125.
36. See Gov'T PRINTING OFFICE, CONGRESSIONAL BILLS: 110TH CONGRESS
CATALOG, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/BillBrowse.cgi?dbname=110 cong
bills&wrapperTemplate=alll 10bills_wrapper.html&billtype=all (listing all the bills
considered by the 110th Congress in 2007-08).
37. See Craig D. Margolis, House Out of Order: Committee Reform in the Mod-
em House of Representatives, 11 J.L. & POL. 273, 302-03 (1995) (discussing the
problem of subcommittee proliferation as a burdensome demand on Members' time).
142 [ Vol. 76
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with constituents about issues and problems, as well as campaigning for re-
election. Perhaps, given the many important tasks of a Member of Congress
and the limited information obtained through sitting down and reading a bill,
most Members should be excused from this task. Perhaps only the legislators
who are primarily responsible for a bill - sponsors and members of commit-
tees that analyze the bill - should read the text in its entirety. Or perhaps only
their staff members, hired for expertise in a subject matter area, need to read
the text of the bill. 38 According to these commentators, summary reports and
discussions with expert members and staff are not only a much more efficient
use of legislators' time, but also an affirmatively better way to learn about the
effects of the bill.39
This argument is based on a view of Congress as policymaker. Mem-
bers of Congress are tasked with making good policy for the nation.40 To do
so, they need to learn about the problems a bill addresses and how the legal
changes embodied in the bill will affect the real-world landscape. Gaining
this understanding requires a great deal of expert knowledge in a huge variety
of fields - industry, agriculture, finance, foreign affairs, public health, and
many more - that Members cannot be expected to acquire on their own. To
make policy effectively, they have no choice but to rely on experts, both in-
side and outside government, for summaries and analyses of proposed legisla-
tion.
38. See MICHAEL J. MALBIN, UNELECTED REPRESENTATIVES: CONGRESSIONAL
STAFF AND THE FUTURE OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 5 (1980) ("The reason for
committee staffs, and the source of their influence, is an extension of the reason for
having committees: the idea that Congress is best served if members become special-
ists, with the vast majority accepting the expertise of a few on most issues. Commit-
tee staffs grew when it became apparent that even specialized committee members
needed help if Congress was to get the information required for making informed
decisions."); Margolis, supra note 37, at 302 ("Committee and personal staff helped
members fulfill these obligations [of becoming inforned about legislation and per-
forming casework] and, in the process, became essential parts of the institution.").
39. See Posner, supra note 34 ("1 would say a half hour conversation with a
credible expert would be vastly more useful than reading the [Bankruptcy] Code ...
40. Congress is, of course, not the only legitimate policymaker in our constitu-
tional system. See Margaret H. Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judicially Administered
Statutes and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 405, 428 (2008) ("One
need not subscribe to an extreme version of legal realism to recognize that judges
make policy when they interpret vague, ambiguous, or gap-filled statutes, just as
agencies do."); Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelega-
tion to Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2141-42 (2004) (summariz-
ing the debate over whether Congress or the executive branch is a more accountable
policymaker). But Congress is the primary policymaker, since the statutes it enacts
create the opportunity for agencies and courts to fill in the policy gaps. See John F.
Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon ofAvoidance, 2000 SUP. CT. REV.
223, 241 ("All legislation necessarily leaves some measure of policy-making discre-
tion to those who implement it.").
2011] 143
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The argument, as just stated, is entirely true. And yet it omits the prima-
ry function of a legislature. Congress's role is not just to make good policy, it
is to make good law.41 Laws are what transform policy from an abstract idea
into concrete rules functioning in the real world.42
Lawmaking is the primary job of a legislator, and the task of lawmaking
is primarily assigned to Congress. 4 3 As Jeremy Waldron put it, "[A] legisla-
ture is an institution publicly dedicated to making and changing law."4 The
word "legislator" itself demonstrates this; the roots are lex, meaning "law,"
and lator (from the verb ferre), meaning "to bear, carry, bring."4A A legisla-
tor is thus a law-bringer or law-giver. The Oxford English Dictionary defines
a legislator as "[o]ne who makes laws (for a people or nation); a lawgiver; a
member of a legislative body."" Merriam-Webster agrees, defining a legisla-
tor as "one that makes laws especially for a political unit."4 7
The primary power granted to Congress in the Constitution is the mak-
ing of laws. Aside from various self-regulatory powers48 and the impeach-
41. See Waldron, Representative Lawmaking, supra note 27, at 336 ("[A] legis-
lature is an institution publicly dedicated to making and changing law.").
42. See Seidman & Seidman, supra note 29, at 445 ("The drafter chooses the
words of the bill's provisions that, to implement the policy, specify who will do
what."); Waldron, Representative Lawmaking, supra note 27, at 344 ("Principles may
be in the background, but each piece of legislation must be framed so that technical
provisions, with their attendant definitions, procedures, exceptions, and administrative
clauses will actually have the effect of promoting the principles the public thinks are
morally important.").
43. See Roger H. Davidson, The Lawmaking Congress, 56 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 99, 99 (1993) ("Congress's primacy as lawmaker is mandated by the Constitu-
tion and validated by historical experience."); Paul A. Diller, When Congress Passes
an Intentionally Unconstitutional Law: The Military Commissions Act of 2006, 61
SMU L. REV. 281, 286 (2008) ("[T]he Constitution rests the affirmative power to
make law most clearly with Congress."). The President, of course, has an important
role to play through the veto and recommendation powers, see generally Davidson,
supra, at 99 ("[T]oday's chief executives are expected to present legislative agendas
to Congress and to provide Capitol Hill allies with guidance and leadership."); Vasan
Kesavan & J. Gregory Sidak, The Legislator-In-Chief 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1
(2002), but his legislative powers pale in importance compared to those of Congress.
44. Waldron, Representative Lawmaking, supra note 27, at 336 (emphasis add-
ed); see also Waldron, supra note 21, at 22 ("The idea of legislation is the idea of
making or changing law explicitly, through a process and in an institution publicly
dedicated to that task.").
45. 8 OxFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 810 (2d ed. 1989).
46. Id.
47. MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.
com/dictionary/legislator (last visited Nov. 5, 2010).
48. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 5, cls. 1-2 ("Each House shall be the Judge of the
Elections, Retums, and Qualifications of its own Members . . . . Each House may
determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour,
and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.").
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ment process, 49 all of Congress's powers are executed through the enactment
of laws.50 When Congress "makes policy that binds the Nation," its only
legitimate method of proceeding is to pass a law.
Thus, making law is the most fundamental role of a legislator. It is what
Members of Congress are elected to do. Lawmaking is the primary lens
through which we evaluate the legislative process and the performance of
individual legislators. 52 Though each Member of Congress can only become
a policy expert in a few areas (usually those covered by the committees he or
she is appointed to), all of them should become experts, to the extent possible,
in translating policy into law.53 Unlike policy expertise, understanding the
interaction of legal rules does not usually require extensive knowledge of the
fields being regulated. Information about the underlying fields is certainly
helpful, but legal analysis of proposed legislation is a single skill that remains
constant regardless of the subject matter of the bill. This skill is crucial to
every part of the lawmaking endeavor.
The difference between policy and law can be illustrated with an exam-
ple from the 2010 health care bill, known as the Patient Protection and Af-
fordable Care Act (PPACA).54 The text of PPACA changed rapidly in the
49. See id. at art. I, § 2 (House impeachment powers); id. at art. 1, § 3 (Senate
impeachment powers).
50. See id. at art. I, § 8 ("The Congress shall have Power ... [t]o make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Pow-
ers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.").
51. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 754-55 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring); see
also John Copeland Nagle, Newt Gingrich, Dynamic Statutory Interpreter, 143 U. PA.
L. REV. 2209, 2248 (1995) (book review) ("Policy changes are accomplished when
Congress and the President approve a statute that self-consciously makes new law.").
52. See Waldron, Representative Lawmaking, supra note 27, at 337-38.
53. See id. at 344 ("The task of converting principles to statutory provisions is
not easy."). Members with law degrees and professional experience as lawyers will
have an easier time translating policy into law than others. However, it is not some-
thing that requires a law degree. Statute drafting is not even a skill emphasized at law
schools; most law students graduate without ever studying the subject. See Dakota S.
Rudesill, Closing the Legislative Experience Gap: How a Legislative Law Clerk Pro-
gram Will Benefit the Legal Profession and Congress, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 699, 706-
08 (2010) (noting that legislative-branch experience among lawyers and law profes-
sors is dramatically less common than judicial and executive-branch experience);
Seidman & Seidman, supra note 29, at 438 ("If they study legislation at all, legal
academics typically focus on examining how courts interpret legislation."). Nor is
analysis of legislation from an ex ante perspective frequently taught; statutes are in-
terpreted in light of particular fact patterns that arise in real or hypothetical cases. See
Ethan J. Leib, Adding Legislation Courses to the First-Year Curriculum, 58 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 166, 170 (2008) ("[T]he first-year slate of courses tends to be dominated by a
judge-centered perspective on the law, in which all legal questions are answered by
people in black robes - and generally black-robed people at the appellate level.").
54. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
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days before the final vote,s5 but the major policy choices behind the bill had
been clear for a long time. Members of Congress were certainly aware that
the new exchanges for purchasing individual health care coverage would not
be operational until 2014, since the debate over the exchanges was a major
part of the policy discussion over PPACA. They probably also knew about
the fines imposed on employers who drop their existing insurance plans.
Many of them were probably aware of a provision requiring Members of
Congress and congressional staff to purchase their own health insurance on
the exchanges, so that they would have the same health care coverage that is
available to ordinary Americans.5 All of these are policy considerations.
The implementation of these policies through legal rules, however, led
to real-world consequences that nobody noticed prior to the passage of the
bill. A few weeks after the bill was enacted, the Congressional Research
Service issued a report that pointed out a major flaw: The exchanges will not
exist until 2014, but the prohibition on Members of Congress and their staff
holding insurance other than through the exchanges arguably takes effect
immediately.57 This was because of a simple drafting error that could have
been caught if more people had read and paid attention to the text of the bill.58
The section requiring legislators and staff to purchase insurance through the
exchanges states that it will become effective "after the effective date of this
subtitle."59 However, that subtitle does not include an effective date. The
default rule of statutory interpretation is that when no effective date is stated,
the new statute takes effect immediately.61
55. See, e.g., Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, H.R. 4872,
111th Cong. (2010) (one of a series of bill drafts introduced before the final language
of PPACA).
56. § 1312(d)(3)(D), 124 Stat. at 183.
57. See Memorandum from Jennifer A Staman et al., Cong. Research Serv.,
Analysis of § 1312(d)(3)(D) of Pub. L. No. 111-148, The Patient Protection and Af-
fordable Care Act, and Its Potential Impact on Members of Congress and Congres-
sional Staff 3-5 (April 2, 2010). The memorandum also suggests arguments that
could be made for a later effective date of the congressional health coverage provi-
sion. Id. at 3. However, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management disagreed with the
CRS interpretation of these provisions. See Letter from John Berry, Director, U.S.
Office of Personnel Mgmt., to The Honorable Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the Honorable Harry Reid, Majority Leader of the Senate (Apr.
16, 2010), available at http://media.npr.org/assets/blogs/health/images/2010/04
/Pelosi-Reid%20on%20FEHB%20coverage.pdf.
58. Staman et al., supra note 57, at 4.
59. § 1312(d)(3)(D), 124 Stat. at 183.
60. Id.
61. See Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 404 (1991) ("[A]bsent a
clear direction by Congress to the contrary, a law takes effect on the date of its enact-
ment."); 2 NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 33:6 (7th ed. 2007) ("A statute takes effect from the date of its pas-
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Following the CRS interpretation of these provisions could create yet
another unintended legal consequence. If Congress is forced to drop em-
ployees from its existing health insurance plan, it could be fined up to $50
million per year under the provision that forbids employers to withdraw exist-
ing plans.62 The statute imposes a fine on Congress for something the statute
requires Congress to do. These are legal issues, not policy ones. They are a
result, not of nefarious policy intent, but of lack of attention to how the legal
rules work together. The problems are apparent from a reading and analysis
of the text of the statute but not from understanding only the policy behind
the law. This is the type of real-world consequence that a careful legislative
process, including reading the bill, could prevent.
Legislators have a duty to perform their jobs with care and take respon-
sibility for the results. 63 Senators and Representatives take the same oath of
office as does every other government officer or employee (aside from the
President, who has a constitutionally prescribed oath of office). 4 The oath
requires legislators to swear or affirm
[T]hat I will support and defend the Constitution of the United
States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear
true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation
freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and
that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on
which I am about to enter. 65
It is the final clause, the promise to "well and faithfull' discharge the
duties of the office," that is relevant to the discussion here. Framed this
sage unless the time is fixed by a constitution or statutory provision, or is otherwise
provided in the statute itself.").
62. See Jonathan Strong, Congress May Get Fined by Its Own Health-Care Law,
DAILY CALLER, Apr. 19, 2010, http://dailycaller.com/2010/04/19/congress-may-get-
fined-by-its-own-health-care-law/.
63. See Waldron, supra note 21, at 23 ("The general duty of care in this regard
means that those who [are] in a position to modify the law have a responsibility to
arrive at a sound view about what makes a legal change a good change or a bad
change.").
64. See U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 1, cl. 7 (oath of office for the President); 5 U.S.C. §
3331 (2006) (oath of office for elected and appointed officials).
65. 5 U.S.C. § 3331.
66. Id. The duties to support, defend, and bear allegiance to the Constitution also
have relevance to the legislative process when proposed legislation may violate a
constitutional provision. See Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to
Constitutional Interpretation, 27 STAN. L. REV. 585, 587 (1975). In that situation,
Members of Congress may also have a duty to exercise their best judgment about
whether the proposed law is constitutional and, if not, to vote against it. Id. at 586,
588. A full analysis of such a duty is beyond the scope of this Article. For more on
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way, the question is: Must a Member of Congress read the text of each-bill
before voting on it, if he or she is to "well and faithfully discharge the duties
of' his or her office?
When voting on proposed legislation, a Member of Congress cannot
perform well and faithfully unless she has a deep understanding of what the
bill will do, both from a policy standpoint and a legal standpoint. Gaining
that understanding is her duty. This is an onerous requirement, which in-
volves a great deal of reading, discussions with staff and experts, and study.
Reading the bill may provide little information about its policy effects, but it
is essential to an understanding of its legal effects. Laws are the rules that
implement a policy, taking that policy from idea to reality. If the bill does
not make good law - if the provisions are internally inconsistent, clash with
existing law, do not focus on the real-world cause of the problem, are too




The importance of reading a bill arises out of the fact that the text of a
bill is important. The text is what becomes the law, not the reports, briefing
books, or explanations.
Some might argue, based on the flexibility accorded to later interpreters,
that the text of a law is not very important for determining its meaning. If
that is so, legislators need not pay attention to the text of the bill, since law is
made in ways other than enacting specific statutory text. The literal text of a
statute does not matter because the executive branch and courts will interpret
the text away if it differs from their favored policy outcomes.69 Text imposes
some constraints on interpreters, but mostly in the form of extra work. The
interpreters will have to spend time and effort justifying their decision to
move away from what a literal reading of the text requires, 70 but they will
these duties, see Brest, supra; Diller, supra note 43; Neal Kumar Katyal, Legislative
Constitutional Interpretation, 50 DUKE L.J. 1335 (2001).
67. See Seidman & Seidman, supra note 29, at 451-56 (describing a step-by-step
method for designing and writing effective legislation that translates policy into legal
rules).
68. See id. at 438 n.9 ("[A] law does not 'work' if it either does not induce its
prescribed behaviors, or if those behaviors, although induced, do not help to resolve
the targeted social problem." (emphasis added)); Waldron, supra note 21, at 23 ("We
want our laws to be efficient devices for promoting the general good. . . .").
69. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA.
L. REV. 1479, 1507-09 (1987) (describing the views of the realist school of statutory
interpretation).
70. See Alexander Volokh, Choosing Interpretive Methods: A Positive Theory of
Judges and Everyone Else, 83 N.Y.U. L. REv. 769, 792-93 (2008) (discussing a
judge's desire to avoid "implausibility costs").
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almost always succeed in ignoring the text and implementing their favored
outcomes.
To take a classic example, a statute stating "No vehicles are allowed in
the park" may eventually be interpreted to mean "All vehicles are allowed in
the park at all times."7 1 But the new rule comes into being through plausible
interpretive steps, always beginning with the text and taking it into account.72
No judge would issue an opinion blatantly stating, "The statute says 'no ve-
hicles are allowed in the park,' and therefore the defendant did not violate the
law when he drove his car through the park." Very strong norms of good
governance require that a judge justify his decision based on an interpretation
of the law, not just make something up.7  Various interpretive methods are
widely accepted as legitimate, but all of them put at least some importance on
the meaning of the words used in the statute, either as a primary or secondary
-74
source of meaning.
It is certainly true that interpreters have latitude to change the meaning
of a statute. That proposition is the entire reason for the study of statutory
interpretation - when a statute is vague or ambiguous, the interpreter may
decide that it has one meaning or another.76 The legislature, however, re-
mains in final control of what the law is. If interpreters depart too far from
what the legislature wants, it can pass a law overriding the disfavored inter-
pretation.77 But what prevents the courts from continuing to impose their
preferences even after a legislative overruling?78 The legislature writes the
override using more specific text, laying out the new legal rules as clearly as
possible. With less vagueness on the part of the legislature, judges have less
71. See Hillel Y. Levin, The Food Stays in the Kitchen: Everything I Needed To
Know About Statutory Interpretation I Learned by the Time 1 Was Nine, 12 GREEN
BAG 337, 337, 343-44 (2009) (providing an illustration of this process).
72. See id. at 337-38.
73. See Volokh, supra note 70, at 781 ("Due to cunent social undertandings -
the widespread belief that democratic, constitutional, or procedural considerations are
relevant - judges feel constrained to justify their decisions as being 'fair' interpreta-
tions of the statute, meaning that there must be a theory of statutory interpretation
underlying them.").
74. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting
Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 845, 846-47, 860-61 (1992) (advocating the use of legis-
lative history to help interpret unclear statutory language); John F. Manning, What
Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLuM. L. REV. 70, 87-88 (2006) (ex-
ploring common ground between textualists and purposivists).
75. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 69.
76. See id.
77. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpre-
tation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 332 (1991). This is not easy to accomplish, but
it can be done and often is. Id. at 367.
78. Courts may sometimes do exactly that. See Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow
Precedents and Separation of Powers: Statutory Interpretation of Congressional
Overrides, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 511, 523 (2009).
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flexibility to craft their own rules departing from the literal text.79 This is true
not just of overriding court decisions, but of all statutes. The more clear and
specific a statute is, the less ability interpreters have to alter its meaning. The
text is not determinative, but it is undeniably important.
Statutory text is crucially important because it is what goes through the
constitutional process of enactment into law. The text of a statute is the only
thing that is voted on and enacted under the formal Article I, Section 7
process, not the legislative history, the intent of the legislators, or any other
information.80 The text, therefore, is the law.1 All interpretive methods,
other than a reading of the plain meaning of text, seek to discover not what
the law is, but additional tools to help understand what the law means. Tex-
tualists make the strongest claim for the importance of statutory text in de-
termining what the law is, arguing that attempts to base the meaning of a sta-
tute on something other than its text undermine the legal system.82 But even
for non-textualists, the power of the text as enacted law should play an impor-
tant role.
Congress, as the governmental body responsible for making statutory
law, has a responsibility to pay close attention to the actual law it is enacting
- the text of the statute. 3 The signatures of the Speaker of the House and the
President of the Senate on the enrolled bill certify that identical text was
passed in both Houses and that all other constitutionally required procedures
were followed.84 Courts will not second-guess this judgment, even in the face
of evidence from the congressional record that different texts were passed in
the two Houses. The courts can impart meaning to the text and require that
lower courts follow precedent, and they can declare a statute unenforceable
79. See id. at 561-65.
80. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7; see also Frank H. Easterbrook, What Does Legislative
History Tell Us?, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 441, 445 (1990) ("What distinguishes laws
from the results of opinion polls . . . is that the laws survived a difficult set of proce-
dural hurdles and either passed by a two-thirds vote or obtained the President's signa-
ture." (emphasis added)).
81. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 7. Congress has, in fact, passed a law recognizing that
only enacted text is law. See 1 U.S.C. § 204 (2006) (stating that the Code of Laws of
the United States is only prima facie evidence of what the laws of the United States
are, but "whenever titles of such Code shall have been enacted into positive law the
text thereof shall be legal evidence of the laws therein contained").
82. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory
Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61 (1994).
83. See Waldron, supra note 21, at 28-29 (arguing that the legislative process
should remain focused on text, not on legislative history for its own sake).
84. Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 672 (1892) ("The signing by
the speaker of the house of representatives, and by the president of the senate . . . of
an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has
passed congress.").
85. See id. at 672-73; Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Dist. of Columbia,
486 F.3d 1342, 1343 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
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due to a conflict with the Constitution, but Congress is the only branch of
government that (acting together with the President or over his veto) can ac-
tually enact, repeal, or amend the text of a statute.86
Thus, Congress is the branch of government that has responsibility for
the text of the statute - for what the law is. Each Senator and Representative
should take that responsibility seriously.
Some statutes serve primarily as delegations of power to administrative
agencies or courts to make legal and policy decisions. Nonetheless, the text
of the statute is still important and should be read by legislators before
enactment. Delegations of power are constrained by the statutory text grant-
ing that delegation. The first question in a case of agency interpretation is
whether the statute unambiguously answers the question.87  And in fact,
courts find clear statutory text that controls an agency's action quite often.8
Courts also require Congress to include in the statute an "intelligible prin-
ciple" to guide the agency's policymaking.89 The text of the statute thus
plays an important role in determining an agency's authority and discretion.
Even when a bill delegates power or is written to be deliberately vague,90
legislators should examine the text to ensure that the scope of the delegation
or vagueness is properly written.
Perhaps the most troubling critique of the importance of text comes
from a practical understanding of what Members of Congress actually do
when analyzing legislation. In general, they spend little time wading through
the text of bills, at least when they are not on the committees charged with the
86. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7; see also Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S.
417, 447 (1998) (holding the Line Item Veto Act unconstitutional because it "gives
the President the unilateral power to change the text of duly enacted statutes").
87. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842-43 (1984) ("First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken
to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the
matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress.").
88. See Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study of the
Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 30-31, 47
(1998) (finding that, when courts apply the Chevron two-step test, 38% of cases are
resolved at step one, an unambiguous statute).
89. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assoc., 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001); Mistretta v.
United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388,
429-30 (1935).
90. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: Judicial Conservatism v. A Prin-
cipled Judicial Activism, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 273, 288 (1987) ("The statutes
are deliberately rendered vague to enable politicians to support particular legislation
that pleases certain constituencies without alienating others. This deliberate vague-
ness shifts the battle over a statute's meaning away from the legislature into the ad-
ministrative process and the courts.").
2011] 151
17
Volokh: Volokh: Read-the-Bill Rule
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2011
MISSOURI LA WRE VIEW
policy area that the particular bill falls into.9' Instead, they look at summary
reports92 and at the coalitions of interests that support or oppose the bill. A
legislator might have a general understanding of the policy embodied in a bill
from reading a committee report and discussing it with her staff.93 She knows
which party (or which factions within each party) supports and opposes the
bill. She knows who is sponsoring the bill and most likely has a detailed
understanding of the sponsors' political and ideological motivations. She has
heard from lobbyists representing a variety of interest groups in support of
and in opposition to the bill. She watches, and possibly participates in, the
political and procedural wrangling over passage of the bill as it occurs. In
sum, she has a deep understanding of the legislative history of the bill but not
much familiarity with the text (or even none at all, if she is not on the com-
mittee that did the markup).
Some scholars view this reality as a reason to favor the use of legislative
history over text in the interpretation of a statute. 94 A court, they argue,
should give effect to the intent of Congress, and Congress's intent is better
expressed in the legislative history (which all Members know and understand)
than in the text of the bill (which is read by only a handful of Members, if
any).95
This is not, strictly speaking, an argument against legislators reading a
bill. Instead, it is an argument that because legislators do not read a bill in
real life, courts should not pay attention to the text of the law either. But just
because a court chooses to accommodate a particular legislative practice does
not mean that the practice is normatively or constitutionally proper. If this
description of legislative behavior is true, legislators are not living up to their
constitutional responsibility to pay attention to the laws they enact. When a
court decides to facilitate that improper behavior by implementing what the
legislature "meant to do" instead of what it actually did, the court ignores,
instead of interprets, the supreme law of the land.96
91. See Christopher Beam, Paper Weight: The Health Care Bill Is More Than
1,000 Pages. Is That a Lot?, SLATE, Aug. 20, 2009, http://www.slate.com/id/
2225820/.
92. See id.
93. See Monica Gabriel & Marie Magleby, Democratic Leader Laughs at Idea
That House Members Would Actually Read Health-Care Bill Before Voting On It,
CNS NEWS, July 7, 2009, http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/50677. The House
Majority Leader described a typical process to the press: "[S]taff and review boards,
they read [the bills] in their entirety. They go over it with members, and members
read substantial portions of the bill themselves . . . ." Id.
94. See, e.g., Cheryl Boudreau, Arthur Lupia, Mathew D. McCubbins, & Daniel
Rodriguez, What Statutes Mean: Interpretive Lessons from Positive Theories of
Communication and Legislation, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 957, 971-73 (2007).
95. Id. at 972-73.
96. See Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 26-28 (2006).
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But some might argue, further, that this common method of becoming
informed about legislation through reports, instead of literally reading the
text, is necessary because of the lack of time available to legislators. If all the
important legislation is to be passed, legislators cannot spend their time read-
ing through the text; they are much too busy.
America has a long history of controlling state and federal legislators
through restrictions on time, however. Many state legislatures work only part
time. More than half of the states fix the length of the legislative session in
their state constitutions.98 State courts have been known to strike down legis-
lation that was passed after the mandated end of a session.99 Some commen-
tators have even advocated making Congress into a part-time legislature to
cut down on the length and complexity of federal legislation.100
Time constraints may well cut down on the amount of legislation that
can be considered and passed. But they do not excuse legislators from doing
their duty - passing new laws in a responsible and informed manner. As
makers of law, which consists of statutory text, legislators should read each
bill before voting to enact it.
These arguments about the primacy of text will be more convincing to
textualists than to adherents of other schools of statutory interpretation.
However, one need not be a textualist to agree that the text of a statute mat-
ters. It constrains interpreters and sets the parameters within which they can
find meanings. Because the text is a crucial part of any inquiry into what the
law is, legislators should take care to know what text they are enacting into
law.
C. Is the Duty Delegable?
Reading the bill is necessary to gain a complete understanding of the
proposed legislation as law. But perhaps a Member of Congress can delegate
the step of literally reading the teKt to someone else - a member of his own
staff, a member of a committee's staff, or another legislator such as the spon-
sor of the bill - and rely on that person's executive summary when making
97. See NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, FULL AND PART-TIME
LEGISLATURES (2009), http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid= 16701 (last visited
Nov. 6, 2010).
98. See id.
99. See, e.g., Wells v. Riviere, 599 S.W.2d 375, 381 (Ark. 1980) (holding that
legislature could not pass state constitutional amendments during an unlawfully ex-
tended legislative session); State ex rel. Heck's Disc. Ctrs., Inc. v. Winters, 132
S.E.2d 374, 376-78 (W. Va. 1963) (striking down a statute passed in the early morn-
ing hours after the mandated end of a legislative session).
100. See DAN GREENBERG, CUTTING CONGRESS DOwN TO SIZE: HOW A PART-
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his decision about whether to vote for the bill. I argue that while many of a
legislator's tasks are delegable, reading the bill is not. Reading and under-
standing the words of a proposed law is a personal responsibility of each in-
dividual member of Congress.' 0
Surprisingly little has been written by legal scholars about the authority
of a Member of Congress to delegate tasks to others. 10 2 The United States
Supreme Court has strictly limited the ability of Congress as a whole to dele-
gate its legislative tasks to congressional officers and committees.' But it
has not weighed in on the question of which tasks must be performed by an
individual Senator or Representative himself and which can be delegated.
One suspects that the Court would treat this issue as a political question to be
resolved internally by Congress. Even if the question never receives a
judicial resolution, it is one that Congress can and should analyze for itself.105
1. Delegation and Privilege
The Court has peered into the internal organization of congressional
staff in cases involving the Speech or Debate Clause. This clause of the Con-
stitution protects Members of Congress from being "questioned in any other
Place" for their legislative activities. 0 6 In Gravel v. United States, the Court
101. See SHEPPARD, supra note 24, at 239 ("[E]ach official must develop a per-
sonal knowledge [of the applicable law], for the official who does not will depend on
others to the peril of the independence of office.").
102. More analysis of the role of congressional staff has been done by political
scientists. See, e.g., MALBIN, supra note 38, at 239-51 (arguing that legislators should
not delegate tasks integral to the deliberative process, including negotiations between
members with opposing views, to staff); DAVID WHITEMAN, COMMUNICATION IN
CONGRESS: MEMBERS, STAFF, AND THE SEARCH FOR INFORMATION (1995).
103. See I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (prohibiting the one-house
veto as an improper delegation of legislative power to a single house of Congress).
104. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) ("Prominent on the surface of
any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable consti-
tutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility
of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution with-
out expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an un-
usual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various depart-
ments on one question."); see also Jesse H. Choper, The Political Question Doctrine:
Suggested Criteria, 54 DUKE L.J. 1457 (2005) (prescribing criteria for examining
constitutional issues considered political questions).
105. See generally Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of
Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978) (arguing that
Congress has a responsibility to analyze constitutional questions the Supreme Court
sidesteps for institutional reasons).
106. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6.
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held that the privilege extends to a Member's staff, at least to the extent that
the aides act as "alter egos" of the Member. 07 "[Flor the purpose of con-
struing the privilege a Member and his aide are to be treated as one."los At
first glance, one might think that an aide who acts as an "alter ego" can be a
delegee for all sorts of legislative tasks.
We should be cautious, however, about extending the Court's reasoning
from the privilege context to the issue of delegation. In the executive branch,
there is a clear difference. The President may delegate almost all executive
tasks to his subordinates in the White House and agencies. 109 Only a handful
of presidential functions are understood to be nondelegable. A 1981 Office
of Legal Counsel memorandum listed seven tasks that the President cannot
delegate to his subordinates: (1) nominating and appointing officers, (2) ap-
proving or vetoing legislation, (3) making treaties, (4) granting pardons, (5)
removing officers, (6) issuing executive orders, and (7) exercising the com-
mander-in-chief power."i0 Almost all of these are constitutionally assigned
functions found explicitly in the text of the Constitution."' The removal
power, not mentioned in the Constitution, is inferred from the constitutionally
assigned appointment power.112 And the power to issue executive orders
stems from the President's role as head of the executive branch.
Yet while the President may delegate all sorts of tasks to his "alter egos"
and lower-ranking subordinates,113 his executive privilege does not extend to
cover them in the same way it covers him. In the aftermath of Watergate, the
Supreme Court declined to extend executive privilege to the President's staff
107. 408 U.S. 606, 616-17 (1972).
108. Id. at 616 (internal quotation marks omitted).
109. See 3 U.S.C. § 301 (2006).
110. Presidential Succession and Delegation in Case of Disability, 5 Op. Off.
Legal Counsel 91, 94-95 (1981).
111. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cf. 1 ("The President shall be Commander in
Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several
States, when called into the actual Service of the United States. . . ."); id. at cl. 2 ("He
shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Trea-
ties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of
the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and
which shall be established by Law . . . ."); id. at cl. 1 ("[H]e shall have Power to grant
Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of
Impeachment."); see also id. at art. I, § 7 ("Every Bill which shall have passed the
House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented
to the President of the United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall
return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated. . .
112. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 195-96 (1926).
113. See, e.g., id. at 132-33 ("Each head of a department is and must be the Presi-
dent's alter ego in the matters of that department where the President is required by
law to exercise authority.").
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in the way the congressional privilege had been extended.'1 4 Nonetheless, the
executive branch continues to believe that the President's executive privilege
extends to aides who serve as alter egos.'ts
Executive privilege remains a hotly contested issue of constitutional
law, but it is apparent that delegation and privilege are not necessarily co-
extensive. In the executive branch, the ability to delegate extends further than
the privilege. In the legislature, the rule may well be the opposite - staffers
are privileged to the extent that they assist a Member, but Members have
limited ability to delegate their constitutionally assigned tasks.
2. Delegation of Decisional vs. Ministerial Tasks
A closer look at the President's list of nondelegable powers reveals a cu-
rious difference between the executive-branch and legislative-branch practic-
es of delegation. In 2005, the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) provided an
excellent illustration by addressing the question "Whether the President May
Sign a Bill by Directing that His Signature be Affixed to It."I17 If the Presi-
dent is away from Washington during the time an enrolled bill is presented
for his signature, may he direct a subordinate to sign the bill for him using an
autopen device? OLC's answer is yes." 8 The opinion draws an important
distinction between making the decision to sign the bill into law and the phys-
ical act of signing the document. "We emphasize that we are not suggesting
that the President may delegate the decision to approve and sign a bill, only
that, having made this decision, he may direct a subordinate to affix the Pres-
ident's signature to the bill."I' The President may delegate the ministerial
formality of a signature but not the decision of whether the bill should be-
come law.120 That decision is his alone.
The practice in Congress has been almost exactly the opposite. Mem-
bers of Congress register their decisions by voting, ultimately on the floor of
each chamber and, before that, in committees. The same questions arise as
114. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 809 (1982) (refusing absolute im-
munity to former aides of President Nixon); see also id. at 822 (Burger, C.J., dissent-
ing) ("I am at a loss . . . to reconcile [the majority's] conclusion with our holding in
Gravel v. United States." (citation omitted)).
115. See, e.g., Immunity of Former Counsel to the President from Compelled
Congressional Testimony, Op. Off. Legal Counsel (2007), 2007 WL 5038035, *1
("Since at least the 1940s, Administrations of both political parties have taken the
position that 'the President and his immediate advisers are absolutely immune from
testimonial compulsion by a Congressional committee."').
116. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 723 (1986); I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
919, 955 (1983).
117. See Op. Off. Legal Counsel (2005), 2005 WL 4979074.
118. See id.
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for the President signing laws: (1) Must a Senator or Representative cast the
vote herself, or is it sufficient to delegate the mechanical casting of the vote
to another person (i.e., casting a proxy vote)121 and (2) Must a Senator or
Representative make the decision of how to vote on her own?
Prox voting has never been permitted on the floor of either chamber of
Congress. It was permitted in congressional committees until 1970, when
the Legislative Reorganization Actl23 placed strict limits on committee proxy
votes. 4 The practice continues only in some Senate committees and confe-
rence committees, not in the House of Representatives.125 Some scholars
argue that the limit on floor voting by proxy is not constitutionally mandated
and that proxy voting could be permitted by a change in the chamber rules.126
This proposition has never been tested in Congress or the courts and has re-
ceived very little scholarly attention. Both chambers of Congress continue to
tightly control the casting of votes on legislation by requiring that it be done
in person on the floor, and almost always in person in committees as well.
By contrast, there appear to be no rules, nor even any published consti-
tutional analysis, about what a Member of Congress may or may not delegate
to subordinates during the decisional process. Seemingly, nothing prohibits a
Member of Congress from walking into a floor vote with a marked ballot
prepared by his staff, without any input by the legislator herself, and entering
those votes without a modicum of personal judgment.
Yet this cannot be proper. Surely a legislator's decision about whether
to vote for or against a bill must be based on her own judgment, just as the
President's decision of whether to sign or veto a bill cannot be delegated.
This is the very job the legislator was elected to perform,127 and the very task
the Constitution entrusts to her. The President and the Member of Congress
121. A proxy vote might be cast by the Member's staff or by another Member.
122. Vermeule, supra note 27, at 407.
123. Pub. L. No. 91-510, 84 Stat. 1140 (1970).
124. See Margolis, supra note 37, at 288-89.
125. SENATE R. XXVI, § 7(a)(3), available at http://rules.senate.gov/public/index.
cfm?p=RuleXXVI (allowing Senators to vote by proxy in committee meetings when:
(1) the rules of the particular committee allow it, (2) the absent Senator has "been
informed of the matter on which he is being recorded," and (3) has affirmatively re-
quested that his proxy vote be recorded); HOUSE REP. R. XI, § f, available at
http://www.rules.house.gov/ruleprec/ll0th.pdf (banning proxy voting in committees);
Vermeule, supra note 27, at 407.
126. See John C. Roberts, Are Congressional Committees Constitutional?: Radi-
cal Textualism, Separation of Powers, and the Enactment Process, 52 CASE. W. RES.
L. REV. 489, 525 (2001) ("[V]oting by proxy, though not now allowed on the floor of
the House and Senate, could be done on regular legislation if a majority chose to
adopt it by rule.").
127. See MALBIN, supra note 38, at 6 ("[T]here can be no doubt that precisely
what staffs do and how they do it are matters that relate to the basic principles under-
lying representative government - the very principles that give members, and through
them their staffs, their reason for being.").
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need not make the decisions entirely alone, without relying on input from
others. Receiving expert advice, listening to the opinions of others, engaging
in debate, even giving a certain amount of deference to experts - all of these
are appropriate aids to reaching a considered judgment. But that judgment, in
the end, belongs to the constitutionally recognized actor, not to a subordinate.
It must be personally exercised by the President and the Member of Con-
128gress.
An analogy to the judicial context can also be made. Many judges have
their clerks draft opinions.1 29 The judge nonetheless makes the actual deci-
sion in the case. He cannot delegate the judicial role entirely to his clerk.
The judge personally hears arguments in the case and will generally instruct
his clerk on the outcome and the reasoning behind it. Only then does the
clerk write the opinion. If the judge did not read and agree with the opinion
before approving it, he would commit a serious neglect of his duty.' The
judge is the primary decision-maker, and the clerk is there to assist in gather-
ing information, looking up precedent, and putting words down on the page.
Reading the opinion, if not writing it himself, is necessary for a judge to accu-
rately understand the law that is being made in his name. Reading the words
of the opinion is necessary for him to make a considered judgment about
what the law is, which is the job he was appointed to do.131
Similarly, a senior partner who signs his name to an appellate brief must
read and understand the arguments made in the brief, even if it is well known
that the work of writing the brief is actually done by lower-level associates.132
By signing it, the senior partner takes responsibility for the content and be-
128. See id, at 247-48 (expressing dismay at the tendency of legislators to dele-
gate tasks involving judgment to staff); SHEPPARD, supra note 24, at 246 ("Certain
decisions must be delegated; that is the nature of bureaucracy. On the other hand,
some decisions are inherent in the nature of office and cannot be delegated to another
person in good faith.").
129. Chad M. Oldfather, Writing, Cognition, and the Nature of the Judicial Func-
tion, 96 GEO. L.J. 1283, 1287 (2008); Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political
Court, 119 HARV. L. REv. 31, 61 (2005) ("[M]ost judicial opinions . .. are ghostwrit-
ten by law clerks.").
130. See Oldfather, supra note 129, at 1325 (arguing that when opinion writing
helps the decision-making process, the judge, not the clerk, should do the actual draft-
ing of the opinion).
131. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.").
132. Posting of Jonathan Adler to The Volokh Conspiracy,
http://volokh.com/2009/09/23/read-the-bill-a-response-to-orin (Sept. 23, 2009, 20:23
EST) ("Think of the legislator like a senior partner. It's perfectly appropriate for the
senior partner to rely upon associates to conduct research, draft documents, review
documents, and so on. But if the partner is going to sign his or her name to a legal
brief, he or she better have read it. It is simply inappropriate for the partner to simply
sign a document or brief on an associate's say-so. By the same token, when the legis-
lator is prepared to enact legislation, he or she should have read the bill.").
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comes subject to sanctions for improper content.' 33 Reading the argument is
necessary to understand the position being taken in his name.
Like the President, and like judges, legislators should undertake the de-
cisional aspects of their jobs themselves. Each Senator and Representative
must make an independent decision about whether to vote for a bill or against
it. And that decision should be made in an informed manner. Reading the
text of a bill is a crucial step in making the decision to enact that bill into law.
Legislators need not write the bills themselves. There are several hun-
dred members of Congress and not all of them can possibly participate in the
writing of each and every bill. Due simply to the size of the legislative body,
legislators primarily evaluate bills written by others rather than writing bills
themselves. A bill can be a perfectly good one even if no legislators partici-
pate in the drafting of it at all, just as a brilliant judicial opinion may be writ-
ten entirely by a clerk. The source of a law is much less important than its
content. The point of reading a bill is for a legislator to evaluate the bill's
content for herself, rather than relying on the assurances of the drafter or
another proponent about what it will do.
Legislators vote on whether to subject the American public to new bind-
ing rules of law. They must personally exercise judgment about whether to
enact those rules. In other contexts, people performing legal roles 34are ex-
pected to read and understand the documents they sign their names to. The
expectation should be no different for Members of Congress. Part of the
process of educating themselves about a bill is reading and understanding the
actual text of the statute, as discussed in the next section.
1II. IMPLEMENTING A READ THE BILL RULE
Implementing a Read the Bill rule is not an easy matter. Three main
problems arise. First, how should the rule be enforced? In light of constitu-
tional and practical difficulties with any statutory rule requiring legislators to
133. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
134. Many, but not all, Members of Congress are lawyers. See Mildred Amer &
Jennifer E. Manning, Membership of the 111th Congress: A Profile, CONG. RES.
SERV. (2008), http://assets.openers.com/rpts/R40086_2008123l.pdf. Even those who
have not attended law school, passed a bar exam, or practiced law have taken it upon
themselves to complete a legal job - making laws. See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 43,
at 102 ("Bill drafting is another phase of the legislative process that most clearly
draws upon legal expertise, including familiarity with constitutional provisions and
concepts."); Rudesill, supra note 53, at 709 (proceeding from an "understand[ing of]
legislative work as legal work"). Most legislators view their time in Congress as a
career, not a brief period of public service. See Davidson, supra note 43, at 100 (de-
scribing the modern Congress as occupied by careerist politicians). If legislating is
their chosen career, they should learn to legislate well. Non-lawyer legislators will
require more help with the legal aspects of their role, but they nonetheless must take
responsibility for their legal work.
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read bills, I argue for a strong norm enforced by a legislator's own colleagues
and ultimately by the electorate.' 3 5  Second, bills are dynamic, not static.
They can change significantly between introduction and a final vote. Which
version(s) must a legislator read? The answer depends on each member's
committee assignments, expertise, and level of involvement on each particu-
lar issue. Third, bills are not easy to understand. Certain bill drafting reforms
could ease the task of reading a bill.
A. "Read the Bill" as a Norm
1. Problems with a Penalty-Enforced Rule
For the most egregious legislative misbehavior, such as bribery and trea-
son, society imposes punishment through criminal law banning the activity.136
Other behavior is not as inherently bad, but can still create abuses of the leg-
islative process. Thus, lobbying, campaign fundraising, and spending are
regulated through complex disclosure and reporting requirements, bans on
certain practices, and criminal penalties for violations. 137
Similar laws might be devised to require Members of Congress to read
bills before voting. Enthusiastic blog commenters have suggested such me-
thods as requiring that each legislator pass a quiz on the contents of a bill
before being allowed to vote on itl38 or sign a statement certifying that he or
135. See SHEPPARD, supra note 24, at 6 ("Other officials, or (less likely) the citi-
zenry, may condemn an immoral official like any bad person, and one tool that is out
of fashion is shame, which is more important but less likely now than offense.").
136. See Bribery of Public Officials and Witnesses, 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2006); Trea-
son, 18 U.S.C. § 2381.
137. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1614 (2006 & Supp. 2010) (disclosure of lobbying
activities); id. § 1606 (providing civil and criminal penalties for violations of lobbying
rules); 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-457 (regulation of federal election campaigns); id. § 437g
(providing for administrative, civil, and criminal enforcement of violations of cam-
paign finance rules).
138. See Comment of Hank Bowman to Posting of David Post to The Volokh
Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/2009/09/23/should-lawmakers-um-read-the-laws-
theyre-voting-on/#comment-662428 (Sept. 23, 2009, 15:08 CST) (comment two,
suggesting voters "should be able to quiz any legislator on what the bill said"); Com-
ment of Postman to Posting of Uncle Dave to Dvorak Uncensored,
http://www.dvorak.org/blog/2009/07/1 0/congress-read-a-bill-fully-before-voting-on-
it-hahahal (July 10, 2009, 4:41 CST) (comment four, suggesting a constitutional
amendment requiring congressional members to "pass a quiz on the content of the bill
before they are allowed to vote on it"). This solution poses several additional practic-
al problems. Who would write the quiz? How would they prevent the contents from
being leaked to legislators? What if the questions were written in the form, "Would
this bill require X?" and legislators honestly disagreed about the answers? What if
the quiz was written (or alleged to be written) to make it easier for supporters to pass
than opponents, or vice versa? In addition, passing this sort of quiz might require
160 [Vol. 76
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she has read and understood the bill.'39 These ideas are, frankly, a bit silly
and undignified. It is difficult to imagine Congress subjecting itself to any
such thing by statute or by including it in the House and Senate Rules.
There are also constitutional concerns implicated in limiting a Member's
right to vote on proposed legislation. If the statute imposes civil or criminal
penalties for Senators or Representatives who vote without having read the
bill, it may run afoul of the Speech or Debate Clause.140 Members of Con-
gress are shielded from criminal prosecutions and civil suits arising out of
their legislative activities.14 1 The clause states, "[F]or any Speech or Debate
in either House, [Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any
other Place."'42 The Supreme Court has interpreted this constitutional provi-
sion broadly to cover a wide variety of activities connected with the process
of legislation. In Kilbourn v. Thompson, the Court held:
It would be a narrow view of the constitutional provision to limit it
to words spoken in debate. The reason of the rule is as forcible in
its application to written reports presented in that body by its
committees, to resolutions offered, which, though in writing, must
be reproduced in speech, and to the act of voting, whether it is
done vocally or by passing between the tellers. In short, to things
generally done in a session of the House by one of its members in
relation to the business before it.143
The Speech or Debate Clause provides absolute immunity against
Members of Congress being forced to defend their legislative actions in
court.'" This immunity "insures that legislators are free to represent the in-
terests of their constituents without fear that they will be later called to task in
the courts for that representation.""45 If a Member of Congress feels that she
can best represent the interests of her constituents by not reading the text of a
detailed knowledge of the contents of the bill, but not necessarily a literal reading of
the text. Legislators would be able to acquire the necessary information to pass the
quiz by reading summaries and talking with sponsors and staff.
139. See Comment of PaddyL to Posting of David Post to The Volokh Conspira-
cy, http://volokh.com/2009/09/23/should-lawmakers-um-read-the-laws-theyre-voting-
on/#comment-662551 (Sept. 24, 2009, 17:54 CST) (comment 125, suggesting laws to
require legislators to "certify under penalty of perjury" that they understand the bills).
140. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
14 1. Id.
142. Id.
143. 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1880).
144. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 502-03 (1969) ("[The [Speech or
Debate] clause not only provides a defense on the merits but also protects a legislator
from the burden of defending himself."); Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 85
(1967) (per curiam) ("[L]egislators ... should be protected not only from the conse-
quences of litigation's results but also from the burden of defending themselves.").
145. Powell, 395 U.S. at 503.
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bill but by instead spending her time on other legislative tasks, that judgment
cannot be questioned in the courts. No judicially-enforced penalty can be
imposed on Members who fail to read the text of a bill before voting.
In light of these concerns, it would be best to impose a Read the Bill rule
through some method other than a statute. Strong penalties, either imposed
by the courts or through deprivation of a Member's vote, are not the only way
to induce compliance with a rule. Instead, structures can be put in place to
enhance the ability and the incentive to read bills.
2. Two Facilitating Rule Changes
Some good government reforms of congressional procedures require not
just new norms, but substantial changes to Congress's internal institutional
design. One subject that has received a great deal of attention in the recent
academic literature, for instance, is constitutional decision-making in Con-
gress.146 Scholars have proposed significant and detailed changes to Con-
gress's committee structure and rules of debate to facilitate deliberation on
constitutional issues.147 Unlike the constitutional decision-making reforms,
implementing a Read the Bill rule does not require extensive changes to Con-
gress's institutional operating procedure. This is because reading the bill is
an individual duty of each Member of Congress, not something that requires
the collective deliberation or decision-making of Congress (or each chamber)
as a whole.148
The most basic change to the chamber rules that would facilitate Mem-
bers reading bills is a rule that requires the full text of a bill to be available to
all Members for a reasonable amount of time prior to the final floor vote.
This could be a set amount of time or a sliding scale based on the page or
word count of individual bills.149 Such a rule would prevent bills from being
rushed through without providing at least an opportunity for legislators to
146. See, e.g., Brest, supra note 66; Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, Institu-
tional Design of a Thayerian Congress, 50 DuKE L.J. 1277 (2001); Katyal, supra note
66.
147. See Garrett & Vermeule, supra note 146, at 1303-30.
148. See Waldron, supra note 21, at 23 ("[R]esponsible lawmakers ought to pay
careful attention to the relation between their own individual decisions and the even-
tual effects, on citizens and on society, of the law that they make (or fail to make).").
149. Several Read the Bill proponents have settled on seventy-two hours as the
amount of time the text of a bill should be available - to Congress and to the public -
before a vote. See Let Freedom Ring, supra note 9; Read the Bill, supra note 9.
Another commentator has suggested five days as a better time period. See Greenberg,
supra note 7. A sliding scale would have the additional benefit of encouraging short-
er bills that can be passed more quickly.
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read them. 50 This rule should be nonwaivable, or waivable only in bona-fide
emergency situations by a supermajority vote.
A second rule change could make bills easier to understand on a
straightforward reading. This rule would require the version of the bill made
available to Members to include a "redline" version of all existing laws
amended by the new bill. Sections that are removed by the new law would be
printed in strikethrough text, and sections added would be underlined.
A bill often consists of pages and pages of amendments such as, "Sec-
tion 1905 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1396d), as amended by sec-
tions 2001(a)(3) and 2001(b)(2), is amended - (1) in subsection (b), in the
first sentence, by striking 'subsection (y)' and inserting 'subsections and
(aa)'; and (2) by adding at the end the following new subsection . . . ."' The
new subsection is then presented out of context, requiring the legislator (or
his staff member) to search for the statute being amended and figure out what
the changes mean. Even more obscure is when an amendment strikes lan-
guage without adding any, and without giving any indication of the content
being stricken.
The House of Representatives already recognizes this problem. House
Rule XIII(3)(e)(1) requires that when a committee reports a bill that would
repeal or amend part of an existing statute, the committee report must include
a comparative print of the statutory text as amended. 152 This Rule should be
expanded to apply to the final version of a bill before a vote. Changes made
during the floor debate and in conference committee should not be left ob-
scure. The final version of the bill that is presented for a floor vote should
either be written to incorporate the text being changed or should be accompa-
nied by a redline report that is accessible to all Members (and preferably to
the public as well) for the full waiting period time proposed above.15 1
3. Creating a Read the Bill Norm
Members of Congress should be encouraged to read the text of bills
through the cultivation of a norm or expectation that they do so. Just as main-
150. See Barbara Sinclair, Question: What's Wrong with Congress? Answer: It's
a Democratic Legislature, 89 B.U. L. REV. 387, 396-97 (2009) (advocating streng-
thened "layover requirements" to give legislators enough time to read proposed legis-
lation before a vote, and noting that the House of Representatives in the 110th Con-
gress usually abided by the layover rule); see also Waldron, Representative Lawmak-
ing, supra note 27, at 352 ("Legislation requires time and careful deliberation. . . .").
151. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat.
119, § 2006 (2010). This text is the beginning of the section of the Senate health care
bill known as the "Louisiana Purchase" and is described infra note 223-27 and ac-
companying text.
152. H.R.R. XIII(3)(e)(1), available at http://www.rules.house.gov/ruleprec/
1 Oth.pdf.
153. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
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taining a free society requires a public culture that values freedom,154 main-
taining a properly functioning legislative body requires norms that support
responsible legislation. A norm of reading bills could be facilitated by the
institutional changes described above. The norm could be enforced through
changes within Congress, as described in this section, and also by voters at
the ballot box. Existing norms about the behavior of Members of Congress
include norms of deliberation and public-oriented justifications.15 5
Norms are weaker forces than laws for influencing behavior. Still, they
can and do change the way people behave. 15 This is easily seen in the situa-
tion of judges in the United States. Society expects them to be impartial and
independent.'57 Though there are only a few, rarely used, enforcement me-
chanisms to require judges to decide cases impartially, judges routinely use
voluntary recusals to maintain an unbiased judicial system and even to avoid
the appearance of impropriety. Judges also have historically exercised a great
deal of self-restraint in their decisions,158 dating back to Marbury v. Madi-
son.159 This zealous protection of judicial norms has maintained, to a large
degree, a societal sense of honor and respect for judges.160
American public opinion seems to have fewer expectations of our legis-
lators than our judges. One norm that does motivate the behavior of legisla-
tors is a norm of service in the public interest, though legislators usually also
act with a combination of this and other, less charitable purposes. 1i Jeremy
154. See, e.g., WALDRON, supra note 27, at 84 ("[P]aper declarations are worth
little if not accompanied by the appropriate political culture of liberty. And if politi-
cal culture is as important to liberty as a set of institutional constraints, then we
should stop pretending that political philosophy is interested only in prescribing insti-
tutions." (footnote omitted)).
155. See Garrett & Vermeule, supra note 146, at 1291.
156. See SHEPPARD, supra note 24, at 4 ("Officials act with very few controls or
penalties, other than their access to promotion or image. The selection of officials
and culture of officials are therefore the most likely external influences on how an
official exercises discretion.").
157. See Lawrence M. Friedman, Judging the Judges: Some Remarks on the Way
Judges Think and the Way Judges Act, in NORMS AND THE LAW 139, 141 (John N.
Drobak ed., 2006).
158. See Harry T. Edwards, Judicial Norms: A Judge's Perspective, in NORMS
AND THE LAW 230, 232 (John N. Drobak ed., 2006) ("[S]elf-restraint has been a cru-
cial key to the success of the judiciary in the United States in establishing the enfor-
ceability of its decisions. . . . Self-restraint helps build up the courts' constitutional
legitimacy over time ..... (emphasis omitted)).
159. 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (holding a statute unconstitutional but refraining from
issuing an order to the President).
160. See Friedman, supra note 157, at 147-48.
161. See Garrett & Vermeule, supra note 146, at 1287-90 (explaining that legisla-
tors are motivated by a complex mix of self-interested and public-interested motiva-
tions). The norm of acting in the public interest is so important that challenging it
provides the source of the humor behind a recent satirical article written in the
"voice" of the House Minority Leader, openly stating that he does not value public-
[Vol. 76164
30
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 76, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol76/iss1/5
A READ-THE-BILL RULE FOR CONGRESS
Waldron has noted how our "idealized picture of judging" is combined "with
a disreputable picture of legislating"' and has suggested that the develop-
ment of an ideal view of legislating could result in a better ground for scho-
larly evaluation of how the legislature actually behaves.163 Such an ideal may
also put pressure on legislators, through their constituents, to behave more in
accordance with the ideal. In that spirit, a norm of reading the bill could be
helpful.
A small group of norm entrepreneurs in Congress could bring a Read the
Bill norm to the forefront. Imagine the following situation: The majority
party's leadership creates a large, complex bill that is unpopular among inde-
pendents and members of the minority party. The majority party has sped
through the legislative process in order to ride a wave of momentum and
avoid giving opponents an opportunity to closely investigate the bill's con-
tents and publicize the less popular portions. To ensure the bill's passage,
they pressure a number of moderate majority-party members from swing
districts to support it. Those members have a golden political opportunity to
oppose the bill (thus avoiding anger from their largely anti-bill constituents)
while covering their disloyalty to the party with talk about good legislative
practices. Those swing-district moderates could issue statements saying,
"This bill may or may not be good for our country. I do not know. I cannot
know, because the leadership has not given me or any of my colleagues time
to sit down and read the bill to find out what is in it. The contents have
changed drastically from day to day, with long amendments adding and re-
moving provisions. The leadership insists that I should just trust them that
the bill is good. I cannot abdicate my responsibility to read the bill and make
that judgment for myself. Therefore, I must in good conscience vote against
this bill, because I cannot vote to impose law on the American people that I
have not seen for myself is a good law. To do so would violate the trust that
the people of my district have placed in me."
interested actions. See John Boehner, Commentary, My Constituents Care Way More
About Political Gamesmanship than Jobs, Health Care, and the Economy, THE
ONION, Mar. 2, 2010, available at http://www.theonion.com/content/opinion/my
constituents care waymore.
162. See WALDRON, supra note 27, at 2.
163. See Waldron, Representative Lawmaking, supra note 27, at 354 ("[W]e can-
not undertake intelligent disparagement or criticism of our legislative institutions if
we do not have a well-thought-through ideal which we can use to hold up to them for
comparison. I do not mean a utopian ideal, one which cannot possibly be realized in
practice. I mean a realistic normative account that shows us the moderate standards to
which we ought to be holding our lawmaking. Otherwise - if there is no well-
thought-through normative ideal - our criticisms will consist of intuitive gut-
reactions, rather than intelligent assessments based on some articulate sense of what a
good set of legislative institutions ought to be.").
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That statement would certainly make headlines. 164 It would be a dra-
matic change from the existing norm of legislators not valuing a literal read-
ing of the text.165 Defenders of the status quo would likely become angry and
dismissive in response to such a statement.
Several Members of Congress have already responded dismissively to
the Read the Bill movement. At a National Press Club event, Rep. John Con-
yers mocked the Read the Bill movement: "I love these members, they get up
and say, 'Read the Bill.' . . . What good is reading the bill if it's a thousand
pages and you don't have two days and two lawyers to find out what it means
after you read the bill?"1 66 Rep. Steny Hoyer also laughed in the face of a
question from the press about the Read the Bill idea, saying, "If every mem-
ber pledged to not vote for it if they hadn't read it in its entirety, I think we
would have very few votes.. .. I'm laughing because. . . I don't know how
long this bill is going to be, but it's going to be a very long bill." 6 7 Then-
Senator Roland Burris also reportedly "seemed baffled by the thought of ac-
tually reading the entire bill." 1 68 Nancy Pelosi, the Speaker of the House at
the time, was also dismissive of the public's ability to read the bill. In a
speech at the National Association of Counties, she argued, "[W]e have to
164. Some Members of Congress have complained about not having time to read
certain bills before a vote was called, but they have not made high-profile statements
linking the fast pace to their votes. See, e.g., Ryan Byrnes & Edwin Mora, Democrat-
ic Senator Predicts None of His Colleagues 'Will Have the Chance' to Read Final
Stimulus Bill Before Vote, CNS NEWS, Feb. 12, 2009, http://www.cnsnews.com
/news/article/43478 ("Some lawmakers said one of the reasons they would not vote
for the bill was because there would be no time to study it before it came up for a
vote."). Most of the complaining Members have been in the minority party, thus
attracting criticism that their professed desire to read the bill was based on political
opportunism. See id. (quoting three Republican representatives); John Dickerson,
Just Skim It: Why Reading Aloud the Senate's Health Care Bill is a Waste of Every-
one's Time, SLATE, Dec. 17, 2009, available at http://www.slate.com/id/2239067/
pagenum/all ("It's a bipartisan complaint usually made by the party in the minority.").
165. Senator George Voinovich, who claims to have read the entire February 2009
stimulus bill before its passage, refused to comment on whether his colleagues would
also read the bill before voting. See Byrnes & Mora, supra note 164; see also Ste-
phen T. Colbert, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship,
Refugees, Border Security, and International Law, House of Representatives, Com-
mittee on the Judiciary (Sept. 24, 2010), transcript available at
http://bluewavenews.com/blog/2010/09/24/stephen-colbert-does-congress-video-
accurate-transcript/ ("[W]hy isn't the government doing anything? Maybe this Ag
Jobs bill would help, I don't know. Like most members of Congress, I haven't read
it.").
166. Ballasy, supra note 6.
167. Gabriel & Magleby, supra note 93.
168. Byrnes & Mora, supra note 164.
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,,169pass the [health care] bill so that you can find out what is in it .... But
ignorance of pending legislation is clearly no virtue in a legislator.170
There is some evidence, however, that a good number of legislators
want to spend more time focused on the task of reading and learning about
bills. In an internal survey in 1993, Members were asked to rank a list of
tasks that they would like to spend more time on.171 Thirty-one percent of
them said their first choice was to spend more time on "studying or reading
about legislation or future issues."l72 More than 78% of Members ranked this
as one of their top five priorities to spend more time on.173 The task of study-
ing or reading about legislation was the most popular choice both as the num-
ber one priority and in the top five as a whole. 74 More recently, Sen. Tom
Coburn has taken up the Read the Bill cause. He attempted to amend the
health care bill to include a certification that every Senator read the text and
demanded that a nearly 800-page amendment be read aloud on the Senate
floor.175
If a few members of the majority party consistently committed to a Read
the Bill pledge, creating difficulties for quick passa e of legislation, the party
leadership would be forced to make some changes. 76 The leadership would,
169. Press Release, Nancy Pelosi, Pelosi Remarks at the 2010 Legislative Confe-
rence for National Association of Counties (Mar. 9, 2010), available at
http://pelosi.house.gov/news/press-releases/2010/03/releases-Marchl 0-conf.shtml.
170. See SHEPPARD, supra note 24, at 239 ("An official has no moral claim to
ignorance.").
171. JOINT COMM. ON THE ORGANIZATION OF CONG., FINAL REPORT OF THE JOINT




174. See id. at 281-87. The other choices in the survey were "attending committee
hearings, meetings, and markups"; "meetings in Wash. on legislative issues with
colleagues, govt. officials, or lobbyists"; "attending floor debate or watching it on
television"; "giving speeches or making personal appearances to talk about legislation
before Congress, other than in your District or State"; "managing and administering
your office"; "fundraising for your next campaign, for other campaigns, or for your
party"; "keeping track (oversight) of the way administrative agencies are implement-
ing national policies and programs"; "meeting personally with constituents when they
are in Washington"; "attending meetings and otherwise working with LSO's and
other informal groups to which you belong"; "working with party leaders on coalition
building"; and "returning home to meet with citizens of your State or District." See
generally id.
175. See Dana Milbank, Obama vs. the Liberals: Pass the Tea to the Left, WASH.
POST, Dec. 17, 2009, at A2, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/12/16/AR2009121603640.html.
176. See Michael J. Gerhardt, Norm Theory and the Future of the Federal Ap-
pointments Process, 50 DUKE L.J. 1687, 1690 (2001) ("[T]he success of political
leaders as norm entrepreneurs depends less on their personal attributes than on their
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of course, attempt to fight back against a norm change that would make it
more difficult to pass legislation it favors.177 The norm entrepreneurs would
need to have significant resolve and refuse offers to be bought out in ex-
change for extra pork barrel spending for their home districts, progress on
their legislative priorities, or other enticements. They would also have to
persevere against any retaliation against them by Read the Bill opponents,
such as refusal to act on bills they sponsor.
Senators and Representatives supporting a Read the Bill norm could
pressure their colleagues to read bills as well. Members of Congress con-
stantly rely on each other for support of their legislative priorities, explana-
tions of bills in their areas of expertise, and other things. If a particular
Member is known for not reading bills, or not reading them carefully, other
Members might ask how they can rely on her to properly inform them about
the contents and probable effects of a bill she supports. In this way, a norm
of reading and thorough understanding could take hold.179
Ultimately, voters can enforce a Read the Bill norm at the ballot box.
This norm is, understandably, not usually the first thing on voters' minds
when they vote in a general election. One Read the Bill opponent put the
choice in stark terms:
[I]magine you go into the voting booth and you have two choices.
The first choice is Legislator A, who votes the way you like, shares
your ideology, and generally "gets it," even though he's not exact-
ly a policy wonk and he doesn't actually read the bills. The second
choice is Legislator B, who usually votes the wrong way, and is
misguided on everything important, but who very conscientiously
reads every word of every bill on his way to his wrong votes.
Would you vote for Legislator A or Legislator B?180
Most people, more concerned with substantive policy outcomes than
procedural good governance issues, will vote for Legislator A. But this stark
choice between Legislator A and Legislator B is not the most relevant situa-
tion to consider.
manipulation of resources, including their political support, to withstand retaliation
for attempted innovations and expansions of institutional prerogatives.").
177. See id. at 1710-14 (providing examples of norm entrepreneurship and retalia-
tion by opponents of the new norms).
178. See id. at 1710 ("Creating new norms entails risking sanctions, because it
often requires violating existing norms.").
179. See SHEPPARD, supra note 24, at 240 ("[O]fficials must depend on other
officials for information. This is an obstacle to knowledge, but it is an obstacle that
can be diminished by acting without imprudent haste.").
180. See Posting of Orin Kerr to The Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com
/2009/09/23/another-question-for-those-who-want-legislators-to-take-the-read-the-
bill-pledge/ (Sept. 23, 2009, 19:39 CST).
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More important is what happens in a primary election. At the primary
stage, voters usually have a choice between two or more candidates who all
share a significant number of the voters' own policy views, since they are all
members of the same party. At this stage, voters can make choices between
candidates with subtly different policy positions, between candidates with
different policy priorities, and between candidates with different views on
governance issues like reading the bill.s18 Primary voters can help ensure that
a Read the Bill candidate appears on the general election ballot - or even that
both parties' candidates favor reading the bills before voting.
Norms held by voters can also influence the views of candidates running
for office. If grass-roots support for reading the bill is strong, candidates may
choose to take a Read the Bill pledge or emphasize the issue in their cam-
paigns. In the 1990s, the governance issue of term limits gained popular sa-
lience.' 82  Many congressional candidates voluntarily took term-limits
pledges, promising that they would run for only a specific number of terms in
office before retiring. Some of these candidates later broke their term limits
pledges,1 83 but others kept them.184 Whether they kept the pledge or not, that
pledge helped them get elected in the first place by appealing to the norm that
was publicly popular. Taking the pledge also strengthened the term-limit
norm, though it remains weak enough for pledge-breakers to be re-elected
with some frequency. 185
Another problem with enforcement of a Read the Bill norm by the pub-
lic is voters' lack of knowledge about the legal rules legislators enact into
law. The public often looks at Congressional votes for their symbolic value
rather than the ultimate legal or even policy outcomes.' 86 This is why a bill
titled the "Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008"' 81 (CPSIA)
181. Cf Garrett & Vermeule, supra note 146, at 1288 ("[S]ome constituents might
desire a representative who takes constitutional argument seriously, and might punish
a representative who appears wholly opportunistic about the Constitution.").
182. See Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures, Legislative Term Limits: An
Overview, http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=14849 (last visited Jan. 20, 2011).
183. See Andrea Stone, Term-Limit Pledges Get Left Behind, USA TODAY (Apr.
12, 2006), available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-04-12-term-
limits x.htm.
184. See Press Release, Senator Sam Brownback, Brownback Formally An-
nounces That He Will Not Run for Re-Election to Senate (Dec. 19, 2009), available
at http://brownback.senate.gov/public/press/record.cfm?id=306113 ("Today, I am
formally announcing that I will honor my pledge [to serve only two terms in the Se-
nate] and I will not be a candidate for the U.S. Senate in 2010.").
185. See Open Congress, Term Limits, http://www.opencongress.org/wiki/
Term limits (collecting data on congressional candidates who voluntarily took term-
limit pledges).
186. See Jeffrey A. Jenkins & Michael C. Munger, Investigating the Incidence of
Killer Amendments in Congress, 65 J. POL. 498, 501-02 (2003).
187. H.R. 4040, 110th Cong. (2008) (enacted).
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can garner a huge majority in Congressi8 even if the content of the bill will
actually impose onerous rules that hurt much more than they help.,8 No
politician wants to give his opponent the easy target of labeling him "anti-
safety." This does not excuse those politicians from taking their role as legis-
lators seriously, however. As difficult as it may be, they must do their best to
craft good rules of law (preferably during the negotiation stage rather than
allowing a terrible but good-sounding bill to come to the floor for a final
vote). And they must explain to voters why they made politically unpopular
decisions that they felt were in the public interest.
B. Applying the Read the Bill Norm at Various Stages of the
Legislative Process
A bill is not a static entity. The content of a bill may change dramatical-
ly between its introduction and the final up-or-down vote on the floor of each
chamber. If similar, but non-identical, bills are passed in the House and Se-
nate, the bill will change yet again in a conference committee and be brought
for another vote in both chambers.190 Thus, a legislator who wants to read the
bill does not have an obvious single time to sit down and read the text, certain
that he will never have to do it again. Instead, the legislator has to cope with
the changes made to the bill as it moves through the legislative process. The
level of attention devoted to each bill will depend on a legislator's relation-
ship to that bill. A legislator might be a sponsor of a bill, a member of a
committee considering the bill, a sponsor of an amendment to the bill, a ma-
jor advocate for or against the bill, a target of lobbying, or simply a bystander
until the final vote. One major benefit of implementing Read the Bill as a
norm rather than a codified rule is the opportunity for flexibility in how it
applies to these different situations.
This section is not intended to be a definitive guide to the application of
a Read the Bill norm in Congress. My intent here is only to begin to think
about some of the issues involved in implementing a Read the Bill norm,
providing a starting point for further analysis and experimentation. Norms
work best when they develop organically to fit the situations, not when they
are categorically imposed from outside the context in which they are to be
used. Individual legislators can take the ideas raised here as a starting point
188. The House of Representatives passed the final conference committee version
of this bill by a vote of 424 to 1. GovTrack.us, H.R. 4040: Consumer Product Safety
Improvement Act of 2008, http://www.govtrack.us/congressfbill.xpd?bill=hl10-
4040&tab=votes. The Senate passed it 89 to 3. Id.
189. See, e.g., Leslie Wayne, Burden of Safety Law Imperils Small Toymakers,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2009 (explaining how the CPSIA's well-intentioned, yet expen-
sive, safety-testing requirements threaten to bankrupt small businesses that make
children's toys from safe, natural materials, while allowing large toy manufacturers
with a history of safety problems to corner the market).
190. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 26, at 25.
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for experimentation about how to apply the norm in their own processes of
learning about pending legislation.
1. Sponsoring and Introducing a Bill
The sponsor of a bill will usually be its strongest proponent. Other
members rely on the sponsor for information about why the bill is important
and what it will do. The sponsor should therefore be a leading expert in the
content of his own bill.
But how important is the text of a bill at the time of its introduction? A
legislator may well expect that significant changes will be made to the text as
the bill moves through the legislative process. Many final bills are complete-
ly unrecognizable from their initial form, everything but the bill number hav-
ing been changed between introduction and enactment. If this is the expecta-
tion, perhaps the initial text of the bill is less important to write well, as good
law.
Massive textual changes at different stages of the legislative process are
one thing that makes it difficult for both legislators and the public to keep
track of what is being considered by Congress. If legislative language is in-
troduced with the expectation that it will be dramatically changed later, eve-
ryone who is not "in the loop" is prevented from making useful comments
about the effects of a bill and from proposing amendments based on the exist-
ing text.191 Thus, the legislative process would be more democratically open
and responsive if bills were introduced with language that could plausibly
become the basis of the final text.
The nature of the legislative process is that bills are crafted through ne-
gotiation. This absolutely requires changes to the text as the bill moves
through committees, to the floor, to the other chamber, and back. A complex
bill cannot, and should not, be introduced in its final form. Nonetheless, the
sponsor of a bill should do his best to introduce plausible statutory language
rather than placeholders that pave the way for a future complete rewrite.
Doing so will allow discussions of the legal effects of the bill from the outset
and make the process more participatory.
The duty of ordinary, non-sponsor legislators to read the bill should not
universally kick in at the time the bill is introduced. Most bills die without
ever making it to a floor vote, meaning that the majority of legislators never
consider or vote on them at all. In the 110th Congress, which was in session
from 2007 through 2008, 7,340 bills were introduced in the House of Repre-
191. See Gerald B.H. Solomon & Donald R. Wolfensberger, The Decline of Deli-
berative Democracy in the House and Proposals for Reform, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
321, 358 (1994) ("[S]ubstitutes disadvantage members who wish to draft amendments
based on the bill as it was reported by the committee of jurisdiction. Substitutes also
confuse House members about what it is they are voting on, since no committee re-
port is available to explain the changes.").
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sentativesl 92 and 3,741 were introduced in the Senate.'93 Of these, only 460
were enacted into law,194 and seven were approved by the House and Senate
but vetoed and not overridden.' 95 Most of the others died in committee; some
were voted down on the floor of the House or Senate. Reading every intro-
duced bill would be an overwhelming task for each individual Senator or
Representative to undertake, particularly considering that they would have to
read the same bills again if those bills came to a floor vote in a changed form.
Since the majority of bills never get a floor vote at all, and those that do are
likely to change before getting there, it does not make sense to expect every
legislator to read all the bills at their introduction. The duty to read bills at
this stage belongs only to the sponsors of the bill and possibly to legislators
who plan to be heavily involved in the negotiations over the bill from the
outset.
2. Committee Consideration and Markup
Members of congressional committees are expected to become experts
in the substantive area of those committees.196 This enables them to better
understand the bills that are considered by the committee, to write committee
reports on legislation (or supervise committee staff who write the reports),
and to intelligently discuss the bills with other legislators and with constitu-
ents and interest groups. Committee members also participate in bill mar-
kups, in which the legislative language is amended in detail to produce the
version of the bill that will progress to the floor if voted out of committee., 97
At this stage, committee members should do a careful reading of the bill.
They should read the original text that was introduced and sent to the com-
mittee so they know what they are starting from. They should read and un-
derstand all the amendments being considered by the committee before voting
on them. And then, if there have been a significant number of major amend-
192. See GOv'T PRINTING OFFICE, CONGRESSIONAL BILLS: I 10m CONGRESS
CATALOG, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/BillBrowse.cgi?dbname=
110 cong bills&wrapperTemplate=alll lObillswrapper.html&billtype=all (listing
7,340 bills with the H.R. designation).
193. See id. (listing 3,741 bills with the S. designation).
194. See Gov'T PRINTING OFFICE, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LAWS: BROWSE 110'
CONGRESS, http://www.gpoaccess.gov/plaws/ll0publ.html (listing the 460 public
laws enacted by the 110th Congress between 2007-2008).
195. See U.S. Senate, Vetoes by President George W. Bush, http://www.senate.
gov/reference/Legislation/Vetoes/BushGW.htm (listing seven bills vetoed in 2007
during the first session of the 110th Congress and four bills vetoed in 2008 during the
second session of the 110th Congress).
196. See Margolis, supra note 37, at 279 ("Members of a committee can use their
particular expertise to 'fine tune' a bill before reporting it to the full House . . . .").
197. See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 43, at 100, 106 ("[Congress's) detailed legis-
lative work is conducted mainly in its committee rooms.").
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ments, such that the legislators may have lost track of how everything fits
together during the process of amendment, there should be a final opportunity
to read and consider the new statutory language before the committee votes
on whether to send the bill to the floor.
3. Amendments
In general, legislators voting on an amendment should read and under-
stand both the amendment and the original text of the bill. Without reading
both, they cannot truly understand how the amendment would affect the pro-
posed legislation, so they would not know what rules of law they are voting
to proceed with. This is true both at the committee stage and when amend-
ments are proposed on the floor.
Three types of amendments require separate consideration here: riders,
"killer amendments," and substitute amendments. Riders are provisions that
have little or no relationship to the main content of the statute but are attached
to a popular bill so they can be enacted into law even if the provision on its
own could not gamer majority support.' 98 Killer amendments are the oppo-
site - highly unpopular provisions attached to a popular bill in a bid to make
it so objectionable that it will lose its majority support. 199 Substitute amend-
ments are amendments that strike out the entire text of the bill and replace it
with new text.200
The first two types of amendments are not good-faith attempts to im-
prove a bill. Instead, they are political ploys. A legislator thus need not un-
derstand the text of the main bill before voting on whether to attach a rider or
a killer amendment. A rider is essentially a stand-alone legislative proposal
that is attached to a different legislative proposal (the existing bill).20 A leg-
islator should be able to vote to attach a rider after reading just the rider, even
if he has never looked at the text of the main bill, since it does not change
anything about the bill as it exists before the rider.
A killer amendment is more complex. This type of amendment could be
an unpopular stand-alone provision, like a rider. But it might also be an
amendment to the main subject of the legislation. It might be designed to
weaken the legal rules being created, rendering the bill toothless. Or it might
dramatically strengthen the legal rules being created, making them too unpa-
latable or controversial to gamer majority support.
The classic example of a killer amendment is the latter type. During the
floor debate over the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Sen. Howard "Judge" Smith
famously proposed an amendment to add the word "sex" to the list of forbid-
198. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 26, at 34.
199. See id.; Jenkins &. Munger, supra note 186, at 499 ("The ostensible purpose
of a killer amendment is to transform a bill that is a sure winner into a loser.").
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den grounds of employment discrimination (adding it to the existing grounds
20
of race, color, religion, and national origin).202 Sen. Smith hoped that by
adding this highly controversial amendment to the bill, he could defeat its
passage.203 He miscalculated, however, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964
became law with the prohibition on sex discrimination attached.20
This episode illustrates a problem with killer amendments - sometimes
they are successfully attached, but fail to kill the bill and actually do become
law.205 The sponsor, and the legislators voting for the amendment, must
make a political calculation weighing the chance of killing the bill against the
chance of the dreaded provision actually becoming law. This maneuver, un-
like attaching a rider, requires a good understanding of what the proposed
legislation would do as well as how the amendment would change it. Those
voting for a killer amendment thus should read both the amendment and the
original bill.
Those voting against a killer amendment, however, may not need to
read the amendment in detail. Supporters of the bill may need to do no more
than identify the amendment as an attempt at killing the bill before deciding
to vote against it. The precise details of how the amendment tries to kill the
bill are irrelevant for a legislator in that posture.
This suggests a broader rule: A supporter of a bill who has read and un-
derstood the statutory text and does not see any reason for changes may be
justified in voting against amendments to the bill without reading them. Of
course, a legislator should not assume that the bill is perfect as is. Many of
the amendments might be good ones - clarifying the text, adding beneficial
new provisions, or removing extraneous or harmful provisions. A legislator
should certainly do what he can to create the best law possible. Certainly he
should not vote to include provisions he has not read and understood. But
there may be a point at which a legislator legitimately considers the bill good
enough and decides to focus his attention on other bills instead of perfecting
this one.
Substitute amendments may also provide an opportunity to vote on an
amendment without reading the original bill. A substitute amendment is es-
sentially an opportunity to proceed with completely new text, but without
starting the legislative process over from the beginning. Since the entirety of
the original bill is removed when a substitute amendment is adopted,206 it is
probably permissible for a legislator to vote for a substitute amendment when
he has read the amendment but not the original text of the bill. Yet substitute
amendments can be troublesome, particularly near the end of the legislative
202. See id. at 14, 34.
203. Id. at 14.
204. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h-6 (2006).
205. Jenkins & Munger, supra note 186 ("If outcomes are not known with certain-
ty at the time legislators cast their votes, then it is quite possible that expectations
could be mistaken and inconsistent.").
206. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 26, at 34.
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process, because they require all of the legislators who have been following
the bill to begin again, reading an entirely new text and re-analyzing the ef-
fects of the bill.
4. Cloture and Floor Votes
When a bill comes to the floor of the House or Senate, every Member of
that chamber becomes involved. The general duty of all Members to read the
bill should come into play sometime during this stage.
Fundamentally, a legislator should not vote to enact a bill and impose
new rules of law on the public without reading the bill himself and under-
standing those new rules of law. This requires reading the bill in its final
form before an up-or-down vote. However, the floor debate usually involves
the opportunity for amendment of the text. To participate effectively in pro-
posing and voting on amendments, a legislator must have read the text of the
bill and the amendment in advance.
One way to approach this problem is for legislators to start reading the
bill when it is calendared, so they have a working knowledge of it by the time
debate begins. If significant changes are made through amendment, they can
then read the changed portions or the entire bill again before the final vote.
Senators may choose to vote against cloture if they have not had suffi-
cient time to read the bill. A successful cloture vote provides that debate will
last no more than thirty additional hours.207 If that would not be enough time
for a Senator to read the final bill, voting no would be appropriate.
When a bill is sent to conference committee after passing the House and
Senate in different versions, each Member must again take a close look at the
text when the compromise bill returns to see what changes have been made.
He should read any parts that have been changed from the version that passed
his own chamber. After so much focus on the text at the initial passage stage,
it would make no sense to rely solely on the conference report at the end.
The post-conference text is the actual text that will become law if passed.
5. Yes Votes vs. No Votes
The duty to read the bill should be stronger when a legislator votes in
favor of a bill than when he votes against it. When a legislator wants to im-
pose new rules of law on the public, he should be very sure about what those
rules of law are.
207. See SENATE R. XXII (2), available at http://rules.senate.gov/public/index.
cfm?p-RuleXXVI ("After no more than thirty hours of consideration of the measure,
motion, or other matter on which cloture has been invoked, the Senate shall proceed,
without any further debate on any question, to vote on the final disposition thereof...
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A legislator voting against a bill also makes a judgment about what rules
of law should be in effect. He indirectly votes for the current rule rather than
a new one. It would, of course, be best if the legislator understood both the
new rule of law and the present one, and affirmatively preferred the status
quo. Legislators should certainly do their best to read all bills that come up
for a final vote and become substantially informed about the changes being
proposed. But the core of the duty to read the bill is the duty to take care in
making new law.
This leads to an easy-to-follow rule for legislators: If legislators have
not had enough time to read the text of a bill that is brought for a floor vote,
they should vote no or not vote at all. This rule encourages a bill's propo-
nents not to rush it through without thorough consideration. If the proponents
want their bill to pass, and there are enough legislators abiding by the Read
the Bill norm, the proponents will have to provide sufficient time to read the
bill.
Framing the duty this way leads to an obvious status quo bias. Because
the duty to read a bill is imposed only for voting yes, voting no is much easi-
er. Our constitutional system is full of rules that purposely cause a status quo
bias. The many procedural hurdles in the legislative process make it very
difficult to pass legislation.208 A bill must not only achieve majority support
in both the House and Senate, it must make it through the committees in each
chamber first. It can be subject to a filibuster in the Senate. The conference
committee may change the text substantially and then it must be passed again
in both chambers. The President has an opportunity to veto it, which kills the
bill unless it receives two-thirds support in both chambers for a veto override.
This is not a quick and easy process. The Framers made it difficult on pur-
209
pose.
A Read the Bill duty adds to the status quo bias, but only weakly. It
does not impose any supermajority requirement. It is not even particularly
difficult to comply with. All it requires is time. A delay of at most a few
days will generally provide sufficient time for every Member of Congress to
read a bill and come to the floor prepared to vote.
Some commentators argue that a Read the Bill rule for yes votes but not
for no votes would create a libertarian anti-federal-legislation bias. However,
a Read the Bill rule applies just as much to bills repealing existing law as to
bills creating new law. Any change in the existing legal framework requires
208. See Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism,
79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1339-40 (2001); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron,
Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1441, 1444-48 (2008); McNollgast, Positive
Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J.
705, 720-21 (1992).
209. See John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian
Constitution, 80 TEX. L. REV. 703, 805 (2002) (detailing the Framers' intent to "en-
sure[] government by popular consent while avoiding the danger of resting its essen-
tial business ... of mere majority will").
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legislators to carefully read and understand the new law they are creating,
whether that is a system of new regulations, a change to the current system of
regulations, or a complete removal of the regulations. 210
An interesting middle case is how the duty applies when a bill is pre-
sented to extend or reauthorize a statute that is about to expire due to a sunset
provision. If the legislature does nothing, the controlling law will change.
But the change was anticipated, and people may have relied upon it, particu-
211larly in areas like the tax code in which professionals plan far in advance.211
In other cases, such as the recent Voting Rights Act Reauthorization,
changing circumstances in the real world between the original act and the
reauthorization may even lead to questions about the statute's continued con-
stitutionality. 213 The burden of literally reading the text of a bill is rather light
in these cases, simply due to the fact that a reauthorization of an existing law
can be written in very few words. The Voting Rights Act Reauthorization
runs only four pages in the statutes at large,214 though some of this consists of
line edits to non-included statutory sections that would also have to be read.
The real challenge is in analyzing the constitutional and policy questions. 2 15
C. Legislative Drafting for a Read the Bill Legislature
Perhaps the most common complaint about a Read the Bill rule is that
bills are simply much too long for an individual Member of Congress to read
216them all. There is some merit to this objection. Though the modem Con-
gress passes fewer bills per year than in prior decades, the number of pages of
210. A Read the Bill norm might work in favor of repeals over enactment of new
laws because a repeal can be accomplished with significantly fewer words. However,
responsible deregulation usually involves replacing restrictive rules with less restric-
tive ones, not wiping away a section of code entirely.
211. See generally Rebecca M. Kysar, The Sun Also Rises: The Political Economy
of Sunset Provisions in the Tax Code, 40 GA. L. REV. 335 (2006) (discussing sunset
provisions in tax legislation and the difficulties they pose for taxpayers' financial
planning); Manoj Viswanathan, Note, Sunset Provisions in the Tax Code: A Critical
Evaluation and Prescriptions for the Future, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 656 (2007) (same).
212. Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577
(2006).
213. See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2525 (2009)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The extensive pattern of discrimination that led the Court to
previously uphold § 5 [of the Voting Rights Act] as enforcing the Fifteenth Amend-
ment no longer exists.").
214. See Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights
Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act, 120 Stat. 577.
215. See generally Brest, supra note 66.
216. See Read This!, supra note 22.
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text enacted into law has skyrocketed.217 Some scholars argue that this phe-
nomenon is due to the difficulty of passing federal legislation, which leads to
218logrolling and bundling of legislative provisions into a single bill. While
this may explain why bills tend to be long, it does not explain the increase
over time. In any case, the requirement of reading the entire bill will provide
a countervailing pressure to bring the length of bills back down.
Shorter bills are a good thing in their own right. They make legislation
more accessible to the public, which may balk at reading a 1,000 page bill but
feel comfortable looking through one that is 10 or even 100 pages. When
statutes are understandable, businesses may spend less money on lawyers
who help them come into compliance. An attempt to keep bills short also
provides a reason for committee members to refrain from attaching riders,
which, by themselves, are not popular enough to gamer majority support and
thus have an undemocratic cast.
Further, if proposals are unbundled to keep individual bills shorter, all
participants in the legislative process have an opportunity to make separate
judgments on components that might otherwise be logrolled together. Indi-
vidual legislators will have more opportunity to vote for the "good parts"
while voting against the "bad parts" instead of making a compromise judg-
ment on the entire package. The President, too, will have an opportunity to
veto smaller bills rather than face the difficult choice of accepting or rejecting
the entire package. Congress once sought to give the President this power, at
least for budget bills, in the form of the line item veto. The Supreme Court
held that the line item veto, as implemented, was unconstitutional,219 but, of
course, if each provision is presented as a separate bill, the President may
veto any one individually. 220 Smaller bills offer the President not only a bet-
ter opportunity to veto bills based on his policy disagreements with Congress
but also a less difficult decision when faced with a provision of a bill he con-
siders unconstitutional.221 Thus, reading the bill could also lead to fewer bills
being enacted into law. This could encourage Members of Congress to focus
217. See Beam, supra note 91 ("In 1948, Congress passed 906 bills. In 2006, it
passed only 482. At the same time, the total number of pages of legislation has gone
up from slightly more than 2,000 pages in 1948 to more than 7,000 pages in 2006.
(The average bill length increased over the same period from 2.5 pages to 15.2 pag-
es.)"); see also Posting of Donny Shaw to Open Congress Blog,
http://www.opencongress.org/articles/view/1375-For-Bills-in-Congress-How-Long-
is-Long- (Nov. 25, 2009) (listing the ten longest bills written between 2001 and 2009
by word count).
218. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 208, at 1449.
219. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 447 (1998).
220. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 7; Clinton, 524 U.S. at 471 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
221. See generally Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Executive's Duty to Disre-
gard Unconstitutional Laws, 96 GEo. L.J. 1613 (2008).
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more thoroughly on their top legislative priorities instead of attempting to do
everything at once, and doing it poorly.22
Another major problem is that bills are often written in language that is
very difficult to understand. Sometimes this is out of necessity, such as when
the proposed legislation would govern a highly technical area and must be
written in technical language. Other times, complex legislative language is
motivated by an intent to obscure what is going on. A recent example is the
223
so-called "Louisiana Purchase" in the Senate health care bill. To win the
support of Sen. Mary Landreiu, a moderate Democrat from Louisiana, the bill
was amended to provide Louisiana with an extra $300 million in Medicaid
224funds. But in an attempt to obscure what was going on, the text of the
amendment did not mention Louisiana.225 Instead, it defined a lengthy set of
conditions describing which states would receive extra money - a set of con-
ditions that only Louisiana meets.226 The section describing Louisiana is over
600 words long. These 600 words could have been eliminated and replaced
with just one: "Louisiana." 227
Reading the bill is a more difficult and less useful task when deliberate
obscurity hides the meaning of the text. Because transparency is a major
value of the legislature as an institution,228 part of the Read the Bill norm
should be a norm of writing bills in understandable language.
IV. SHOULD THE PRESIDENT READ THE BILL BEFORE SIGNING IT?
Does the duty to read the bill extend to the President? If Members of
Congress must read the bill before voting to enact it into law, perhaps the
President must also personally read the bill before signing it into law. While
it might be a good practice for the President to read bills before signing, for
all the reasons legislators should do so, the case for a presidential duty to read
bills is much weaker than for a congressional one. The President's involve-
ment with and responsibility for legislation is not as extensive as Congress's.
222. See GREENBERG, supra note 100, at 10 ("Paradoxically, forcing Congressmen
to confine themselves to their top priorities would strengthen Congress: legislative
attention would be more focused, while its authority and product would be taken more
seriously.").
223. See Dana Milbank, Sweeteners for the South, WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 2009,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/21/
AR2009112102272.html ("Staffers on Capitol Hill were calling it the Louisiana Pur-
chase.").
224. See id.
225. See Posting of Jonathan Karl to The Note, http://blogs.abcnews.com
/thenote/2009/11 /the-100-million-health-care-vote.html (Nov. 19, 2009, 15:03 EST).
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. See Waldron, Representative Lawmaking, supra note 27, at 337-40.
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A. The Recommendation Clause
The Constitution states that the President "shall . . . recommend to
[Congress'si consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and
expedient."2 9 Some scholars argue that this clause, the Recommendation
Clause, reveals that the Framers intended the President to take a strong role in
the legislative process.230
However, even though the President has the power - or perhaps the du-
ty, given the use of the word "shall" rather than "may" 231 - to recommend
legislation to Congress, his formal legislative role is quite limited. Nothing
requires Congress to act on the President's legislative recommendations. The
President's recommendation does not even ensure that his bill will be intro-
duced in Congress, since only a Member of Congress may introduce a bill. In
practice, the President can be a powerful player in the legislative process, but
this is due to his political influence and the veto power, not because of any
constitutional power to intrude into Congress's legislative process.
B. The Veto Power
No bill can become law without either the President's approval or the
support of a two-thirds majority of both houses of Congress to override his
veto.232 A President need not actually exercise the veto to affect legislative
outcomes. Congress always negotiates with an understanding of the Presi-
233dent's role in the legislative process. Thus, Congress will sometimes agree
to alter legislation in ways the President wants, because he threatens to veto
the bill if they do not.
This means that, in practice, the President is often a major player in de-
termining what goes into a final bill and what does not. In this respect, he
acts as a legislator does, negotiating the content of the bill and sometimes
having his own staff draft legislative language. But he does so from the out-
side, like a lobbyist for an interest group, not as a participant who actually
gets to vote on the bill.
In the end, when the bill is passed and comes to the President's desk, he
is the only person who can stand in the way of the bill becoming law. The
courts may strike down a statute on constitutional grounds, but if the problem
is simply bad policy or a bill that does not work properly to bring about the
policy it intends, courts will not interfere with the judgment of the political
229. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
230. See, e.g., Kesavan & Sidak, supra note 43, at 35-63.
231. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. But see Nora Rotter Tillman & Seth Barrett
Tillman, A Fragment on Shall and May, 50 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 453 (2010).
232. U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 7.
233. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article 1, Section 7
Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523, 532-33 (1992).
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branches about what the law should be.234 The President is thus the final
actor who either creates the law with his signature or prevents it from being
enacted.235 Some might argue that this makes the President even more re-
sponsible for the content of a law than an individual legislator, since the legis-
lator's vote is balanced against others, while the President makes the final,
unilateral decision to sign a bill into law.
A bill can become law without the President's signature, however. One
way for this to happen is, as mentioned above, a veto override. The other
way is for the President to simply ignore the bill while Congress remains in
session. The Constitution provides that "[i]f any Bill shall not be returned by
the President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been
presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed
it," unless Congress has adjourned during that time.236 This is a constitution-
ally mandated method for a bill to become law without the President's expli-
cit approval. If the President has not read the bill and does not sign it, it non-
etheless becomes law. It is difficult to consider this process an abdication of
the President's duty to read the bill, since the Constitution specifically allows
for a bill to become law without any action by the President whatsoever. This
counsels against finding a presidential duty to read the bill.
The ten-day period also highlights the fact that time constraints weigh
differently on the President than on Congress. Congress does not have an
unlimited amount of time to pass bills,237 but the time periods are measured in
months, or even the entire two-year session of Congress. 238 The President, by
contrast, has an extremely short time period in which to consider a bill passed
by Congress. The Constitution gives the President only ten days to sign or
veto a bill.239 With the President's many other executive responsibilities, this
may not be enough time to read the entire bill before signing it. It may be
234. See Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955) ("The Oklahoma
law may exact a needless, wasteful requirement in many cases. But it is for the legis-
lature, not the courts, to balance the advantages and disadvantages of the new re-
quirement.").
235. Veto overrides are possible, of course, but they are difficult to accomplish
and thus rarely occur.
236. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
237. See supra Part I.B.
238. One scholar has even taken the view that the Senate and House of Represent-
atives may pass the same bill in different sessions of Congress. See Seth Barrett
Tillman, Colloquy, Noncontemporaneous Lawmaking: Can the 110th Senate Enact a
Bill Passed by the 109th House?, 16 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 331 (2007); Seth
Barrett Tillman, Reply, Defending the (Not So) Indefensible, 16 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 363 (2007). This is not the traditional view, however. See Aaron-Andrew P.
Bruhl, Response, Against Mix-and-Match Lawmaking, 16 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
349, 350 (2007) ("The 'contemporaneity' requirement is one of those rules that 'eve-
ryone knows' (or at least thinks they know) but that is seldom defended.").
239. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
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particularly troublesome if Congress passes several large bills in a short time
frame.
C. The Appointments Clause Analogy
The Appointments Clause does not govern the legislative process, but it
provides a useful analogy. Like the legislative process, the appointments
process crosses two branches of government. The appointments power is
shared between the President and the Senate. The Constitution lays out the
roles of each participant in the process: "[The President] shall nominate, and
by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint [officers of
the federal government]."240 Many scholars argue that the Senate should
review the President's nominees deferentially, particularly in the appointment
of executive officers (as opposed to judges). The Senate has an important
role to play in the appointments process, but should not exercise completely
independent judgment. The President is the primary actor in the appoint-
ments process and makes the fundamentally important decision of whom to
242
nominate.
The legislative process switches the primary and secondary roles. Con-
gress is the primary actor in deciding what legislation to enact. The Recom-
mendation Clause allows the President to recommend legislation to Con-
gress, 243 but this certainly does not mean that all, or even most, legislation is
244initiated by the President. Perhaps the President should be somewhat defe-
rential to Congress's legislation in the way that Congress should be somewhat
deferential to the President's nominees for federal office.
This deference could take a variety of forms. For instance, the President
may decide to exercise his veto power primarily when he believes that a bill
is unconstitutional instead of for policy disagreements with Congress, as pres-
240. Id. at art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
241. See, e.g., William G. Ross, The Senate's Constitutional Role in Confirming
Cabinet Nominees and Other Executive Officers, 48 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1123, 1143-
44 (1998) (summarizing the consensus view that "the Senate should normally defer
[at least in] part to the President's choice of executive officials"). Others believe the
Senate should take a much more active role in the Advice and Consent process. See,
e.g., Jeff Yates & William Gillespie, Supreme Court Power Play: Assessing the Ap-
propriate Role of the Senate in the Confirmation Process, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1053 (2001).
242. See Hanah Metchis Volokh, The Two Appointments Clauses: Statutory Qua-
lifications for Federal Officers, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 745, 754 (2008) (arguing that
the President, as the first mover in nominations, cannot be constrained by Congress in
his choice of nominee).
243. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
244. See MALBIN, supra note 38, at 27 ("Despite the popular misperceptions about
executive branch domination of Congress's agenda, the fact is that much important
legislation gets its start in Congress.").
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idents did in the first decades after the Founding. 245 Or, in a very different
conception of deference, the President may choose to exercise his judgment
about the policy aspects of a law but defer to Congress to work out the tech-
nical details of the bill's language. Under this view, the President may sign a
law without reading it because he trusts that Congress, as a separate branch of
government duly performing its constitutional responsibilities, has written an
effective law to carry out its desired policy.
To the extent that the duty to read a bill arises out of a responsibility to
personally make sure that the laws are good ones whenever there is an oppor-
tunity to do so, perhaps it also applies to the President. But because the duty
is actually a consequence of a broader understanding of the constitutional role
of Congress, the duty seems much weaker in the context of the President.
Congress is the branch of government tasked with creating the details of the
law, so the duty attaches primarily to legislators.246
V. CONCLUSION
Senators and Representatives are elected to Congress for the purpose of
making laws that will govern the nation. Their role in the constitutional
process of legislation requires them to exercise their considered judgment
when voting. In order to be properly informed about what the law is, these
legislators should read the actual text of the bill they are voting on. That text,
and nothing else, will become the law of the land.
Implementing this reform would require a significant paradigm shift
among Members of Congress and their staffs. Such changes do not happen
overnight, but emerge slowly from the changing expectations of the public
about how their representatives should behave.
Even if every Member of Congress were to take this advice and make a
serious attempt to read the text of each bill before voting, perhaps there still
would not be enough time in the day for them to accomplish this task. Does
this make the proposal so impractical as to be useless? I think not. There is
still significant value in a Read the Bill norm even if the ideal can never be
completely realized. The norm serves to focus a legislator's attention on his
lawmaking function, the primary task for which he was elected. If he makes
the attempt to read bills, and spends more of his time becoming acquainted
with the legal effects of pending legislation instead of concentrating on other
activities, that in itself fulfills good legisprudential principles. The activities
of Congress are currently so far outside the legisprudential ideal that any
245. See EDWARD S. CORwIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787-1984,
at 279 (4th rev. ed., N.Y. Univ. Press, Inc. 1957) (1940) (discussing early uses of the
veto power).
246. See MALBIN, supra note 38, at 246 (arguing that the President can delegate
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move in this direction would constitute an improvement. Instead of a com-
plex norm involving an amorphous goal of being "informed" before a vote,
the relatively simple and concrete norm of reading the bill can provide a clear
focus for legislation-oriented activity among Members of Congress.
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